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näin ollen tutumpia sijoittajille. Tutkimukseni tähdentää Sveitsin, Japanin ja Yhdysvaltojen 
merkitystä päärahoitusmaina omilla alueillaan tutkimusjakson aikana tammikuusta 1999 
tammikuuhun 2014. Otokseni koostuu 28 valuutasta EMEA:n, Aasian ja Tyynenmeren sekä 
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1. Introduction 
The currency carry trade is a popular trading strategy where one borrows in low interest rates 
“funding currencies” and invests in high interest rates “investment currencies”. According to the 
uncovered interest parity (UIP), the carry gains arising from the differential between foreign and 
domestic interest rates are offset by the expected depreciation of the investment currency. 
However, investment currencies have been found to appreciate on average against funding 
currencies, moving completely opposite direction what the UIP would predict (see, e.g., Hansen 
and Hodrick, 1980; Fama, 1984). Thus, an investor participating in currency carry trade would 
earn the interest rate differential and also benefit from the investment currency appreciation 
during the holding period. This violation of the UIP makes the carry trade profitable on average 
and it is known as the “forward premium puzzle". 
The positive currency excess returns have been widely documented for the past three decades. 
Although carry trade returns have decreased over time (see, e.g., Jylhä and Suominen, 2011), the 
forward premium puzzle still exist. Fama (1984) suggests that if investment currencies deliver 
low returns during bad times, then carry trade profits are nothing but compensation for higher 
risk-exposure. However, it has been difficult to identify risk factors behind carry trade returns. 
Recent studies find that the time-varying risk premium on investment currencies might reflect 
crash risk or rare disasters (see, e.g., Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen, 2009; Farhi, Fraiberger, 
Gabaix, Ranciere, and Verdelhan, 2013; Farhi and Garbaix, 2011; Jurek, 2014; Ferreira Filipe 
and Suominen, 2013) or the currencies might have different sensitivity to systematic risk factors 
(see, e.g., Lustig and Verdelhan, 2007; Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan, 2011; Menkhoff, 
Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf, 2012; Verdelhan, 2010). While all these papers try to explain 
average excess returns on carry portfolios with global risk factors, my study aims to shed new 
light to the forward premium puzzle by examining the risk-return relationship between regional 
risk measures and carry trade returns. 
1.1. Academic and practical motivation 
In this thesis, I investigate home bias in carry trade. Although home bias is well documented 
phenomenon in equity markets, it has not been studied before in currency market to best of my 
knowledge. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that distance, language and culture are all factors 
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influencing investors’ investment decisions. People find familiar assets attractive and invest 
heavily in those, while they put little or no capital at all in ambiguous assets (Barberis and Thaler, 
2003). In the carry trade setting, this means that investor would invest in high interest rate 
countries located usually in the nearby region with similar cultural backgrounds.  
Carry trades can have significant effects on foreign exchange (FX) rates (Galati, Heath, and 
McGuire, 2007). In general, high interest rate currencies, which are targets for carry trades, 
strengthen and funding currencies weakens (Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2007). However, 
from time to time fundamental shocks in the market lead to a sudden unwinding of carry trades, 
causing investment currencies to crash and funding currencies to appreciate sharply 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). The average daily trading in the global FX market reached 
$5.3 trillion in April 2013 (Bank for International Settlements, 2014). A better understanding of 
what drives the carry trade returns and thus FX rates would be highly useful for the investors who 
trade in these huge markets.  
My study is motivated by the novelty paper from Brunnermeier et al. (2009), where they show 
that funding liquidity measures predict exchange rate movements. I find the results relating to 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX) and TED spread, which is the 
difference between the interest rates on 3-month interbank loans and on 3-month Treasury bill 
(T-Bill), especially interesting. They use VIX as a proxy of global risk aversion and TED spread 
as an indicator of tightening funding liquidity. When investors become more risk averse and 
liquidity in the interbank market dries out, funding constraints force speculators to unwind their 
carry trade positions. The investment currency depreciates as the speculative capital is withdrawn 
resulting in carry trade losses. This negative shock has spillover effects and is amplified as more 
speculators unwind their positions causing the investment currency to depreciate even further. 
Moreover, Ferreira Filipe and Suominen (2013) stress that the funding risk in Japan, or in another 
major funding country Switzerland, is a better measure in explaining the carry trade returns than 
funding conditions and funding risk in the U.S. Their findings confirm the importance of 
Japanese yen (JPY) and Swiss franc (CHF) as major funding currencies besides the United States 
dollar (USD). Therefore, it is interesting to investigate more closely whether the funding liquidity 
measures of these three main funding countries have the highest explanatory power for carry 
trade returns when the investment country is located nearby and is more familiar to the investors. 
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1.2. Research problem and purpose 
In order to test the home bias in currency carry trade I sort the sample currencies into three 
different groups according to their geographical location: EMEA (Europe, Middle East and 
Africa), Asia Pacific, and Americas. With this categorization, I try to capture both the distance 
and cultural aspects. I argue that CHF, JPY and USD are the main funding currencies in their 
own region. If investors prefer to invest in currencies that they are more familiar, then the 
funding liquidity measures of Switzerland, Japan and U.S. should have the highest explanatory 
power for carry trade returns in EMEA, Asia Pacific and Americas, respectively. Instead of trying 
to explain the currency carry trade excess returns with global funding liquidity measures, I focus 
on corresponding regional measures with the aim of getting more significant results. 
To measure the funding liquidity in different regions, I select one key volatility measure and 
calculate TED spreads from each of the three main funding countries. My data set contains at 
most 28 different currencies and the sample period spans from January 1999 to January 2014. 
Following Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), I form portfolios from the sample currencies by sorting 
them based on their forward discount. My strategy is to borrow (invest in) the currency with the 
smallest (largest) forward discount within its own region. As a robustness check I also consider 
an alternative strategy where I go long (short) in the three currencies with the three largest 
(smallest) forward discounts. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of every month. I expect 
the risk-return relationship between the main funding countries’ liquidity measures and regional 
carry trade returns to be negative: when the key volatility measures and TED spreads increases 
the carry portfolios experience losses. 
According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) model of liquidity frictions, the tightening 
funding conditions in funding country are linked to large depreciations in investment currency. 
Hence, decreasing risk appetite and tightening funding liquidity in one of the main funding 
countries should also be associated with currency crashes in that regions’ major investment 
countries. I test this by estimating a probit model where the dependent variable takes value 1 if 
crash happens and 0 otherwise. I define a crash when the monthly return of carry portfolio is 
lower than (minus) 1 standard deviation of its returns during the whole sample period. 
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1.3. Contribution to existing research 
My empirical results provide evidence that carry trade activity is biased towards countries that 
are located in the same region than the main funding countries and thus more familiar to 
investors. I find the main funding countries’ key volatility measures to be more significant 
variables than the liquidity spreads when explaining the regional carry trade returns. However, 
the liquidity spreads become also more meaningful when explaining currency crashes in the 
major investment countries. This is linked to the finding that the TED spreads are only relevant 
risk measures when there is turmoil in financial markets. 
In EMEA, the contemporaneous change in the Volatility Index on the Swiss Market Index 
(VSMI), can alone explain around 20 percent of the regional currency carry trade returns, leaving 
other main funding countries’ volatility measures redundant. Also in Americas, the CBOE 
Volatility Index, VIX, produces similar results and is the most dominant variable when 
explaining carry trade excess returns and currency crashes in that region. In Asia Pacific, 
however, the Volatility Index Japan (VXJ) and VIX are both relevant variables. While the change 
in VIX has larger contemporaneous effect to carry trade returns, interestingly part of the effect of 
increasing VXJ comes with delay as the collective action of numerous Japanese retail investors 
can be slow. When taking into consideration all the funding liquidity measures from Japan and 
U.S., they can together explain one third of the carry trade excess returns and over 40 percent of 
the currency crashes in Asia Pacific region. 
My findings stress the importance of Switzerland, Japan and U.S. as the main funding countries 
in their own region. The results imply that investors participating in currency carry trade should 
pay attention to the Swiss volatility measures if the investment country is located in EMEA, and 
U.S. funding liquidity measures if the investment country is located in Americas. Moreover, 
when investing in Asia Pacific, also the U.S. funding liquidity measures are of interest in addition 
to the Japanese ones. Even though there are few papers that examine carry trade returns of some 
specific region or group of countries, my study is the first one to test how the geographical or 
cultural distance from the main funding country affects carry trade activity to best of my 
knowledge. This thesis contributes to the existing research by finding a home bias in currency 
carry trade and thus shedding new light to the forward premium puzzle.  
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1.4. Limitations of the study 
My study has two main limitations. First, the currencies that have only non-deliverable forward 
(NDF) rates are excluded from the sample.1 Doukas and Zhang (2013) compare the performance 
of NDF and deliverable forward carry trades and find that though they share common risk 
factors, the NDF carry trades are driven by deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) due to 
currency convertibility restrictions and capital controls.  
The NDFs are offered by major financial institutions in the over-the-counter market and generally 
used to hedge exposure or speculate on a move in a currency where local market authorities limit 
such activity (see, e.g., Lipscomb, 2005; Doukas and Zhang, 2013). An NDF is alike a regular 
forward FX contract, except it does not require physical delivery of currencies at maturity and it 
is usually settled in U.S dollars as the other currency, typically an emerging market currency with 
capital controls, is “non-deliverable”. The currency convertibility restrictions and capital controls 
make onshore interest rate unavailable to international investors, which means that the offshore 
interest rates must be concluded from the NDF prices. This may lead to a situation where the 
onshore and offshore interest rates differs from each other as a result of a number of factors, such 
as market expectations and liquidity, perceived changes in foreign exchange policy, speculative 
positioning, accessibility to onshore money markets, and the relation between offshore and 
onshore currency forward markets (Ma, Ho, and McCauley, 2004; Lipscomb, 2005). While the 
CIP holds generally for deliverable forward currencies, Doukas and Zhang (2013) find that the 
gap between onshore and offshore interest rate for NDF currencies is economically large (-3.5% 
on annual basis), indicating deviations from CIP in offshore markets and superior performance of 
NDF carry trades. 
Second, my estimates leave out of account bid-ask spreads on currency markets. An investor 
implementing carry trade using forward markets buys a forward contract at the ask price when he 
goes long on investment currency. After receiving the corresponding currency at the end of the 
contract, the investor converts the proceeds back into funding currency at the bid price. As a 
                                                           
1
 Argentine peso, Brazilian real, Chilean peso, Colombian peso and Peruvian nuevo sol were excluded from the 
sample. These five currencies from Americas region have only non-deliverable forward rates available starting from 
March 29, 2004. 
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result, the expected cost for doing this trade is half the bid-ask spread on both the forward and 
spot contract. 
Taking into consideration the transaction costs would reduce the currency excess returns. 
Actually, Burnside et al. (2007) argue, that currency carry trades may be difficult to carry out due 
to the high transaction costs. Farhi et al. (2013) compute an average spread of 8 basis points for 
spot rates and 9 basis points for forwards in their sample of 32 countries during the period of 
1996-2008. This would imply an annual cost around 100 basis points or 1 percent for a currency 
pair with 12 trades per year. However, such spreads might exaggerate transaction costs on 
currency markets, as investors may well roll over their positions each month instead of closing 
them just to reopen them again next day (Gilmore and Hayashi, 2008). This holds also for my 
currency portfolios. Even if the annual transaction costs would be around 100 basis points, all of 
the portfolios would still have large positive excess returns. All in all, the bid-ask spreads do not 
have a significant effect on my empirical findings regarding the explanatory power of different 
volatility measures and liquidity spreads for the carry trade returns and currency crashes. 
1.5. Structure of the study 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background and 
the previous empirical findings explaining the forward premium puzzle and carry trade excess 
returns. In Section 3, I discuss my hypotheses. Section 4 presents the data and methodology used 
in the study. In Section 5, I analyze the empirical results relating to the risk-return relationship 
between the main funding countries’ liquidity measures and regional carry trade returns. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes and gives suggestion for further research. 
1.6. Definitions 
Table 1 below explains the key terms used in this thesis in order to ensure that the reader is aware 
of exact meanings and definitions of these frequently used terms and also to make the reading of 
the thesis easier. 
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Table 1: Definition of key terms 
Carry trade A trading strategy in which an investor borrows in a currency with a relatively low interest rate and invests the funds in a currency yielding a higher interest rate   
Currency excess returns Ex post deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity condition 
Forward exchange rate 
The rate at which trader agrees to exchange one currency for another at some 
specified future date 
Forward discount (or 
premium) 
A currency trades at a forward discount (premium) when its forward price is lower 
(higher) than its spot price 
Funding currency A currency with relatively low interest rate  
Funding liquidity The ease with which traders can obtain funding from the markets 
Home bias The tendency for investors make financial investments in their home markets rather than in foreign markets 
Investment currency A currency with relatively high interest rate 
London Interbank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) 
An indication of the average rate at which some of the world’s leading banks 
charge each other for unsecured short-term loans, in a given currency 
Liquidity spreads 
I use the following commonly used indicators of liquidity in interbank markets to 
capture the funding liquidity in different markets: 
          
• U.S. TED spread (TED) – the difference between 3-month USD LIBOR and 
3-month U.S. Treasury bill 
• Swiss TED spread (S-TED) – the difference between the 3-month CHF 
LIBOR and Switzerland’s 3-month federal money market debt register claims 
 
• Japanese TED spread (J-TED) – the difference between the 3-month JPY 
LIBOR and the Japanese Government 3-month Bill 
Uncovered interest rate parity 
(UIP) 
UIP states that the difference between two countries’ interest rates is equal to the 
expected change in exchange rates between these countries' currencies 
Unbiasedness hypothesis  
This hypothesis states that assuming risk neutrality and rational expectations, the 
forward exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate 
Volatility measures 
I use the following measures of implied volatility of stock index options to capture 
the risk aversion in different markets: 
      
• CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) – a measure of market expectations of volatility 
over the next 30 day period conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices 
      
• Volatility index on the SMI (VSMI) – a duration-independent index that 
applies implicit variances to all Eurex-traded SMI options   
     
• Volatility index Japan (VXJ) – a model-free index of market volatility 
implicit in the bid and asked prices of Nikkei225 options 
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2. Theoretical background 
In this section I provide an overview on the existing literature. First, I discuss about the forward 
premium puzzle which refers to the well documented empirical finding that high interest rate 
currencies tend to appreciate on average relative to low interest rate currencies. The failure of 
unbiasedness hypothesis makes it possible for a speculator to pursue large excepted returns 
through currency carry trade. The question then turns out to be whether the findings of this bias 
are to be interpreted as a time-varying risk premium or as systematic expectation errors. I review 
arguments both in favor and against these views. Finally, I present the novelty empirical findings 
and theory behind the paper of Brunnermeier et al. (2009), where they show that funding 
liquidity measures predict exchange rate movements. 
2.1. Forward premium puzzle and carry trade excess returns 
The forward premium puzzle and the arising carry trade strategy have been widely documented 
for the past three decades. Large expected excess returns from currency carry trades challenge the 
benchmark models in international macroeconomics by bringing out the failure of uncovered 
interest parity and the fact that the forward rate does not provide an unbiased forecast of the 
future spot rate. Actually, in a regression of the future change in the spot rate against the forward 
discount, the exchange rate was found to move in exactly the opposite direction on average from 
what was forecasted. This unexpected finding has been replicated several times, on various sets 
of data, and with many refinements.2 
To fix the concept and terms, I define the k-period interest rate of home and foreign country at 
time t as  and ∗, respectively.  is the spot rate at time t and  is the forward rate at time t 
for a trade to take place at time k. The gross return for lending in the domestic money market is 
simply:  
 1 +  (1) 
Assuming there are no arbitrage opportunities, an investor should get same return than in (1) also 
by converting currency at the spot exchange rate in order to lend in foreign currency and hedging 
                                                           
2
 For surveys see Froot and Thaler (1990), Lewis (1995), Sarno (2005) or Engel (2013). 
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his exchange rate risk by buying home currency in the forward market. The return of this strategy 
is: 
 	1 + ∗
   (2) 
Since lending home currency and lending foreign currency combined with a forward hedge are 
both nominally riskless the investor should be indifferent whether to choose either (1) or (2), 
implying the covered interest parity condition: 
 
	1 + 
(1 + ∗) =
  (3) 
The uncovered interest parity states that the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied without the use of 
a forward hedge against exposure to exchange rate risk. Then the interest differential between 
home and foreign country should be an unbiased forecast of the future spot rate. Thus, one should 
expect: 
  =  +  (4) 
where the forward rate equals the rational expectation of the spot rate at time t+k, given 
information available at time t, and the error term  is an expectational error. 
The puzzle is that in a regression of the future change in the spot rate against the forward 
discount, not only do the regression estimates find the slope coefficient to differ from unity but it 
is even slightly negative on average, indicating a bias in the forward exchange rates (Chinn, 
2007). In order to take a closer look for the different components of the forward premium puzzle, 
equation (4) can be rewritten by taking logarithms (indicated by lowercase letters) and 
subtracting the current log spot rate  from both sides: 
 ∆ =  + ( − ) +  (5) 
where the left hand side of the equation is ex post future depreciation, defined as,  − , and 
the term in the parentheses is the forward discount. Equation (5) is a standard regression equation 
used to test the unbiasedness hypothesis, where under the null  = 0 and  = 1, and the error 
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term, , equals to the forward market forecast error. The null implies that there is no 
systematic time-varying component to the forecast errors: (∆) − 	 − 
 = . To be 
more precise, the unbiasedness hypothesis is actually a joint hypothesis of rational 
expectations:	(∆) = ∆, where (∆) is the mathematical expectation and ∆ is the 
expectation held by investors, and the condition of no time-varying risk premium:  ≡
(∆) − 	 − 
 −  = 0.  
In a typical carry trade, an investor borrows funds in a low interest “funding currency” in order to 
lend in a high interest “investment currency”. If UIP held, the investor would expect to make zero 
profits on average, because the interest differential (or forward discount) would reflect the 
expected depreciation of the investment currency against the funding currency. But the null 
hypothesis of unbiasedness is almost always rejected statistically. In their paper, Meese and 
Rogoff (1983) find that exchange rates changes follow a near random walk, which gives investors 
an opportunity to gain from the interest differential without suffering from the depreciation of the 
investment currency. That is only a near random walk, as Fama (1984) shows that on average 
investment currencies tend to even appreciate against the funding currencies. For instance, Froot 
and Thaler (1990) find in their survey an average estimate of -0.88 for .  
The puzzling result that the coefficient estimates are typically negative suggests that the investor 
implementing a carry trade would also benefit from the investment currency appreciation during 
the holding period on top of the forward discount. However, Chinn and Meredith (2004) show 
that while  is negative on average at short time periods (under one year), the bias tends to 
decrease at longer horizons. Furthermore, Frankel and Poonawala (2010) argue that the forward 
market in emerging currencies is less biased than in major currencies and find the coefficient for 
emerging market currencies to be on average slightly above zero. Also, recent studies report that 
carry trade returns have decreased over time, suggesting evidence that the bias has decreased in 
general over the last forty years (see, e.g., Jylhä and Suominen, 2011). 
There are several reasons why the forward premium puzzle persists even when capital is perfectly 
mobile according to the covered interest parity. Almost all of the explanations fall into two 
categories focusing either on the risk premium or the invalidity of the rational expectations 
hypothesis. Vast majority of the authors contribute to the first category and interpret the 
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systematic component of the forward market’s forecast errors as a risk premium while at the 
same time upholding the rational expectations hypothesis. The second category of explanations 
question the validity of the rational expectations hypothesis and find that market participants 
have systematic expectation errors, at least within the sample.3 I will next review arguments both 
in favor and against these different views. 
2.1.1. Conventional risk-based explanations 
Perhaps the most conventional explanation for the failure of UIP is that there exists a risk 
premium which account for differences between expected changes and actual changes in spot 
rates. However, it has been hard to come up with risk-based models that could fully explain the 
forward premium puzzle. In a simplistic model, risk premium can be measured by assuming that 
the exchange rate follows a random walk. This would suggest that the forward premium is the 
risk premium. The problem with this model, however, is that it is purely mechanical and does not 
provide us any information with economic source of risk (Burnside, 2008). 
Engel (1996) provides a survey of the early attempts to model the risk premium, including tests 
of the consumption CAPM and the latent variable models as well as portfolio-balance and 
general equilibrium models. He concludes that while many things have been ruled out, we have 
not yet found a model of expected returns that fits the data. He stresses further, that in order to 
explain the puzzle, the models need to generate correlations between the risk premium and the 
forward premium.  
Since then, many other risk-based explanations have been forwarded from presence of sticky 
prices in general equilibrium models to consumption based risk premiums and external habit 
preferences. Engel (1999) examines the properties of the risk premium in sticky-price general 
equilibrium models. He compares the two models of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) and Devereux 
and Engel (1998), where monetary shocks will cause changes in consumption because of sticky 
prices and risk premiums arise due to covariation of consumption and exchange rates. He finds 
that while Devereux and Engel (1998) model is capable of producing large enough risk premiums 
to match the data, it cannot generate correlation between the risk premium and the interest 
differential. 
                                                           
3
 The term, systematic expectation errors, is intended to cover the important areas of learning, peso problems, tests of 
rational expectations based on survey data and the models of irrational expectations and speculative bubbles. 
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More recently, Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) show by building currency portfolios according to 
their forward discount that UIP fails in the cross-section between the returns of high and low 
interest rate currencies. They conclude that large excess returns can be achieved by simply 
holding bonds from currencies with currently high interest rates, which have higher loading on 
US consumption growth risk. Burnside (2007) argues, however, that the stochastic discount 
factor corresponding to Lustig and Verdelhan’s (2007) model is uncorrelated to carry trade 
portfolio returns and the forward premium puzzle remains a puzzle. Also Lustig et al. (2011) 
favor a risk-based explanation and use a two-factor interest rate model to explain the cross-
sectional variation in average excess returns between high and low interest rate currencies. Their 
measure of volatility estimates the systematic risk of currency markets without using any 
exchange rate or interest rate data. They find that in the times of high global volatility, investment 
currencies tend to depreciate and funding currencies tend to appreciate, which means that 
investors load up on global risk by participating in currency carry trade. Moreover, Verdelhan 
(2010) shows how risk emerging from consumption habits affects the carry trade returns. He 
finds that during bad times at home country, the domestic interest rates are low, consumption is 
close to the habit level and investors are more risk averse. The changes in exchange rates follow 
domestic consumption shocks when the domestic investor is more risk averse than the foreign 
investor in high interest rate country, implying positive currency carry trade excess returns. 
Despite the latest developments in risk-based models, they have not yet been able to fully explain 
the forward premium puzzle. Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski and Rebelo (2011) construct 
stochastic discount factors from traditional risk measures such as consumption growth, stock 
returns, etc., and find that these risk factors are all statistically uncorrelated with carry trade 
excess return. The same is true for carry portfolios sorted on the basis of the forward premium. 
They make a straightforward argument – “without covariance a risk-based story can’t work”. If 
expected excess return from currency carry trade is non-zero, then the return must covary with 
the risk factor.  
2.1.2. Systematic expectation errors and rare disasters 
Systematic expectation errors include learning, peso problem and other sources of error patterns 
that appear statistically significant within the sample (Frankel and Poonawala, 2010). The 
definition itself does not necessarily mean that market participants are irrational. Among those 
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who fall into the category of attributing the findings of the bias to systematic expectation errors 
are Froot and Frankel (1989). They demonstrate that the standard tests for UIP produce 
significantly different results when survey-based measures of exchange rate depreciation are used 
and find that vast majority of the variation of the forward discount seems to be related to 
expected depreciation rather than a time varying risk premium. 
As mentioned, the rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis does not necessarily mean that 
market participants are irrational. It may be that market participants’ forecasts are biased as they 
are constantly learning about the economic environment. Lewis (1989) is one of the early studies 
incorporating Bayesian learning. In her paper, she investigates how the increase in U.S. money 
demand in the early 1980s affected average dollar forecast errors as the market was learning 
about the new process of money. More recently, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) argue that 
infrequent portfolio decisions can explain the forward premium puzzle. They show that little of 
foreign exchange exposure is actively managed as the welfare gains for doing so are generally 
below fees charged. Because of this infrequent decision making the impact of interest rate shocks 
on exchange rates is delayed and leads to substantial excess return predictability. 
Another argument why the exchange rate puzzles might exist is a “peso problem”. Originally, the 
peso problem referred to a situation where market participants anticipate rare switches in 
monetary policy that are infrequently observed.4 Classical example of this is from the early 
1970s, when the Mexican peso traded at a forward discount for several years even though being 
pegged to the United States dollar. Rogoff (1980) argues that the forward discount seemed to be a 
poor predictor of the change in the value of the peso as the market participants were anticipating 
a policy-driven devaluation of the peso, which did not occur until 1976. The proposal that the 
high measured excess returns are due to some infrequent event that has not materialized or is 
insufficiently represented in the sample would imply that carry trade returns that cannot be 
explained with observed skewness might still be explained with unobserved skewness. 
More recent literature around infrequent events that lead to big negative payoffs tries to explain 
the forward premium puzzle with “rare disaster” models. In the model of Farhi and Gabaix 
(2011), countries differ in their exposures to rare global disasters according to a mean-reverting 
                                                           
4
 Early examples include Rogoff (1980) and Krasker (1980). For nice survey, see Lewis (1995). 
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process. Countries with high risk premium have depreciated exchange rate and high interest rate, 
but as their risk premium mean reverts their exchange rate appreciates, explaining why high 
interest rate currencies appreciate on average. However, Burnside et al. (2011) argue that the 
average payoff of the hedged carry trade is too close to the average payoff of the unhedged carry 
trade for peso problems or rare disasters to be plausible. They document that even after covering 
most of the downside risk with currency options carry trades still seem to be profitable. Farhi et 
al. (2013) decompose the currency risk premia into a Gaussian and a disaster risk premium. They 
form portfolios of hedged and unhedged carry trade excess returns and find that although disaster 
risk has a significant effect in explaining currency returns, it does not account for all carry trade 
returns. On average, the disaster risk premium explains over one third of carry trade returns in 
their recent sample period, 1996-2011, but an investor can still obtain significant excess returns 
while being hedged against large currency crashes due to the remaining Gaussian, non–disaster 
risk. Also Jurek (2014) finds the excess returns of crash-hedged currency carry trades to remain 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that the high returns to carry trades are not due to 
peso problems. Further, he compares the returns of hedged and unhedged currency carry trades 
and reports slightly smaller crash risk premium for the excess returns than Farhi et al. (2013). 
2.2. Funding liquidity as a risk factor 
The empirical failure of conventional risk models or peso problem explanations has led to a 
variety of alternative explanations of the returns to the carry trade or, equivalently, the forward 
premium puzzle. My research is inspired by the novelty paper from Brunnermeier et al. (2009), 
where they show that funding liquidity measures predict exchange rate movements. I find the 
results relating to VIX implied volatility and TED spread the most interesting. Both variables 
seem to be negatively contemporaneously correlated with currency excess returns, while the 
explanatory power of TED spread is also statistically significant for carry trade returns a week 
ahead.  
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) empirical findings share several features of the liquidity spirals that 
arise in the theoretical model in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). They show that speculators 
invest in securities with positive average return and negative skewness. The positive average 
return is compensation for providing liquidity to the market and the securities are negatively 
skewed because of the market participants’ asymmetric response to fundamental shocks. These 
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shocks lead to speculator losses and are amplified when speculators unwind their positions as 
they hit funding constraints. This causes the value of the securities to depress even further leading 
to increased funding problems and higher volatility and margins in the market. On the contrary, 
positive shocks leading to speculator gains are not intensified. 
What makes the model with liquidity frictions unique is that it offers an explanation to the 
forward premium puzzle which is dependent neither on a conventional risk mechanism, nor on 
peso problems. If we picture a standard exchange rate setting where UIP holds, then a country 
suddenly increasing its interest rate would attract new foreign capital which should lead to an 
immediate appreciation of the currency followed by an expected future depreciation of the 
exchange rate. In a model with liquidity frictions, however, the currency only appreciates 
gradually as investors respond to the interest rate increase slowly. In the meantime, holding on to 
the currency carry trade is profitable due to the deviations from UIP. The effect of slow moving 
capital is also documented in other markets (see, e.g., Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007; 
Duffie, 2010). 
Liquidity frictions have also a remarkable impact in currency crashes. Currency carry trades are 
usually highly leveraged and conducted by professional investors (Galati et al., 2007). Local 
equity is common collateral, so the market prices affect the available collateral of investors. Also 
banks in the main funding countries are large investors in the local equity market themselves, so 
when the volatility increases in the local stock market, they are less likely to lend more money or 
accept local equity as collateral (Ferreira Filipe and Suominen, 2013). The deviations from UIP 
are reduced when professional investors lever up their carry trades, but as a consequence also 
investors’ risk of forced liquidation increases (Brunnermeier et al. 2009). Furthermore, it 
becomes more expensive for investor to hedge the carry trade portfolios when the perceived 
downside risk increases. These effects are having a negative impact in investors’ willingness to 
speculate. Hence, in the face of shocks that lead to speculator losses, the liquidity in the market 
goes down and capital constraints are likely to force hedge funds and other speculators to unwind 
their carry trade positions from investment currencies, which then crash due to the sudden capital 
flight. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) find that carry trades experience often losses exactly at the 
times when speculators face funding problems. 
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As discussed above, funding constraints seem to be especially relevant during the times of 
financial stress and increased risk aversion. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) show that the volume of 
speculative trading and the carry trade returns decreases during the weeks when VIX index 
increase. The VIX, which measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500, is not mechanically 
linked to exchange rates since it is derived from equity options. It is often referred to as the “fear 
index” as during periods of financial stress and steep market declines, options tend to become 
more expensive. Thus, the greater the fear in the market, the higher the level of VIX. This 
explains why the changes in implied volatility measures are also interpreted as changes in 
investors’ risk aversion. When VIX increases, investors lose their general appetite for risk, which 
is seen as decreased speculation in the FX market. The unwinding of carry trade positions has 
spillover effects on other speculators leading to even larger losses.  
As another proxy for funding liquidity, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) use the TED spread, which is 
the difference between the 3-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), based on U.S. 
dollar, and the 3-month U.S. T-Bill rate. This spread indicates liquidity in the interbank markets, 
among other things. The LIBOR Eurodollar rate reflects uncollateralized lending in the interbank 
market, which is subject to default risk, while the T-Bill rate is riskless since it is guaranteed by 
the U.S. government. When banks face liquidity problems their willingness to provide funding in 
the interbank market weakens. This leads to increase in the TED spread and often decline in the 
T-Bill rate due to a flight-to-liquidity or fight-to-quality. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) show that 
increase in the TED spread has similar but less significant effects than a rise in VIX. 
Furthermore, the TED spread is also correlated with carry trade losses one week ahead. The 
negative correlation between the TED spread and carry trade returns provides evidence in support 
of the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) theoretical model of liquidity spirals. 
Relating to findings above, Ferreira Filipe and Suominen (2013) also stress the importance of 
funding constraints in currency speculation, but find that the funding risks in Japan and 
Switzerland are better measures in explaining the carry trade returns than funding conditions and 
funding risk in the U.S. (such as the VIX and the TED spread). They measure funding risk for 
carry trades using the equity options’ implied stock market volatility and crash risk in Japan and 
show that these measures can explain 42% of the monthly currency carry trade returns during 
their sample period, 2000-2011. In addition, Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010) argue that some 
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currencies are viewed simply as safe havens and they tend to appreciate when stock market 
volatility increases. This result gives support to Brunnermeier et al. (2009) findings that 
unwinding of carry trades is correlated with VIX. Menkhoff et al. (2012) also confirm some 
relevance for illiquidity as a risk factor. However, they argue that the global volatility risk 
obtained from currency markets dominates liquidity risk and find that FX volatility can explain 
the cross-section of interest rate-sorted currency portfolios. Furthermore, Melvin and Taylor 
(2009) present financial stress index that have some predictive power for carry trade returns. 
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3. Hypotheses 
Unlike the existing literature, which largely relies on different global measures of risk when 
trying to explain the positive excess returns of currency carry trade, my study provides an 
alternative explanation to the forward premium puzzle by finding home bias in the carry trades. 
In this section, I outline the hypotheses that are tested later on in the empirical section of the 
study. I also provide a brief theoretical background behind the stated hypotheses.  
The theoretical background for my study comes from the paper of Brunnermeier et al. (2009). 
They show that decreasing risk appetite and tightening funding liquidity affect the carry trade 
returns. They use VIX as a proxy of global risk aversion and TED spread as an indicator of 
tightening funding liquidity. When VIX and TED spread increase, funding constraints lead to 
increased volatility and increased margins, forcing speculators to unwind their carry trade 
positions. The investment currency depreciates as the speculative capital is withdrawn resulting 
in carry trade losses. This negative shock has spillover effects and is amplified as more 
speculators unwind their positions causing the investment currency to depreciate even further. 
My main argument is that instead of trying to explain the currency carry trade excess returns with 
global funding liquidity measures, one should use corresponding regional measures. Ferreira 
Filipe and Suominen (2013) stress that funding constraint and funding risk in Japan or in another 
funding country, Switzerland, are better measures in explaining the carry trade returns than 
funding conditions in the U.S. Their findings confirm the importance of Japanese yen and Swiss 
franc as major funding currencies besides the United States dollar. Nevertheless, one of these 
three currencies is usually more often used as a funding currency in carry trades than the others, 
depending on the investment currency. I argue that CHF, JPY and USD are the main funding 
currencies in their own region, and due to this regionality the funding liquidity measures of 
Switzerland, Japan and U.S. should have the highest explanatory power for carry trade returns in 
EMEA, Asia Pacific and Americas, respectively.  
H1: The main funding countries’ key volatility measures and liquidity spreads have the highest 
explanatory power for carry trade returns in their own regions  
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Carry trades are extremely difficult to track from the available data which makes it challenging to 
draw the lines for the principal regions of the main funding countries (Galati et al., 2007). One 
reason to assume that there is regionality in carry trades is that investors prefer securities they are 
familiar with. The familiarity is widely documented phenomenon in stock market.5 People find 
familiar assets attractive and invest heavily in those, while they put little or no capital at all in 
ambiguous assets (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). In the carry trade setting, this means that investor 
would invest in high interest rate country located usually in the nearby region with similar 
cultural background.  
According to the model of liquidity frictions, the tightening funding conditions in funding 
country are linked to large depreciations in investment currency. Hence, decreasing risk appetite 
and tightening funding liquidity in one of the main funding countries should be associated with 
currency crashes in that regions’ major investment countries as the speculative capital is 
withdrawn.  
H2: Tightening funding conditions in the main funding country are associated with currency 
crashes in the major investment countries in that region 
To test the hypotheses I use spot and forward exchange rate data of 28 currencies commonly used 
in carry trades. The data and methodology is described in the following section. 
  
                                                           
5
 Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that mutual fund managers in U.S. favor stocks whose company headquarters 
are located nearby their funds’ home office. However, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) argue fund managers’ 
preference for the familiar stocks can be explained with information-based story. They stress that fund managers 
focus on local firms as they are cheaper to research. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) argue against the information-
based explanation and find that distance, language and culture are all factors influencing investors’ investment 
decisions. 
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4. Data and methodology 
This section describes the currency spot and forward rate data, formulation of carry trade excess 
returns and construction of the carry portfolios. Furthermore, I present the risk measures used in 
the empirical analysis and methodology applied in the study. 
4.1. Data on spot and forward rates 
My data set contains at most 28 different currencies, including Australian dollar (AUD), 
Canadian dollar (CAD), Chinese yuan (CNY), Czech koruna (CZK), Danish krone (DKK), Euro 
(EUR), Hong Kong dollar (HKD), Hungarian forint (HUF), Indian rupee (INR), Indonesian 
rupiah (IDR), Japanese yen (JPY), South Korean won (KRW), Malaysian ringgit (MYR), 
Mexican peso (MXN), New Taiwan dollar (TWD), New Zealand dollar (NZD), Norwegian krone 
(NOK), Philippine peso (PHP), Polish złoty (PLN), Pound sterling (GBP), Russian ruble (RUB), 
Singapore dollar (SGD), South African rand (ZAR), Swedish krona (SEK), Swiss franc (CHF), 
Thai baht (THB), Turkish lira (TRY), and United States dollar (USD).  
The sample period spans from January 1999 to January 2014. The data for daily spot exchange 
rates and daily 1-month forward exchange rates to USD are obtained from Barclays Bank 
International and WM/Reuters via Datastream. The forward rates are available for CNY, KRW 
and PLN starting from February 11, 2002 and for RUB starting from March 29, 2004. 
Following Lustig et al. (2011), I exclude the following observations from my sample due to large 
failures of covered interest parity in these countries: Malaysia from August 1998 to June 2005, 
Indonesia from December 2000 to May 2007, and Turkey from October 2000 to November 2001. 
In addition, Jones (2009) reports widespread deviations from covered interest rate parity during 
the latest financial crisis in the fall 2008. However, these deviations have only limited effect on 
the average excess returns during my whole sample period, but as a robustness check, I also 
present the results excluding the financial crisis period.6 
                                                           
6
 Jones (2009) show deviations from the CIP during the financial crisis would have made it possible for an 
arbitrageur to profit 126bp by borrowing in 12-month USD LIBOR and investing in 12-month EUR LIBOR. Returns 
of this magnitude in one of the 15 years of my sample can be considered as measurement error as they would only 
change the average return by around 8 basis points. 
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Spot and forward rates to the other currencies than USD are derived from the spot and forward 
rates to USD assuming there are no triangular arbitrage opportunities: 
 
 !"	# "#$%& 	# "#$ 	=
 !"	# "#$'( %& 	# "#$'(
)  (6) 
Furthermore, I sort the sample currencies into three different groups according to their 
geographical location: EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa), Asia Pacific, and Americas. 
Table 2 shows this division between the regions. There are 12 currencies under EMEA, 13 under 
Asia Pacific and three under Americas. The reason why Americas has only three currencies is 
because most of the other candidates from that region, such as Argentine peso, Brazilian real, 
Chilean peso, Colombian peso and Peruvian nuevo sol, had only non-deliverable forward rates 
available and were therefore excluded from the sample.7  
Table 2: Currencies by region 
 
EMEA   Asia Pacific   Americas 
Czech koruna (CZK) 
 
Australian dollar (AUD) 
 
Canadian dollar (CAD)  
Danish krone (DKK) 
 
Chinese yuan (CNY) 
 
Mexican peso (MXN) 
Euro (EUR) 
 
Hong Kong dollar (HKD) 
 
United States dollar (USD) 
Hungarian forint (HUF) 
 
Indian rupee (INR) 
  
Norwegian krone (NOK) 
 
Indonesian rupiah (IDR) 
  
Polish złoty (PLN) 
 
Japanese yen (JPY) 
  
Pound sterling (GBP) 
 
South Korean won (KRW) 
  
Russian ruble (RUB) 
 
Malaysian ringgit (MYR) 
  
South African rand (ZAR) 
 
New Taiwan dollar (TWD) 
  
Swedish krona (SEK) 
 
New Zealand dollar (NZD) 
  
Swiss franc (CHF) 
 
Philippine peso (PHP) 
  
Turkish lira (TRY) 
 
Singapore dollar (SGD) 
  
    Thai baht (THB)     
 
This table shows the sample currencies sorted to three geographical regions: EMEA (Europe, Middle 
East & Africa), Asia Pacific, and Americas. The sample period spans from January 1999 to January 
2014. Due to data limitations in the forward market CNY, KRW and PLN are included in the sample 
starting from February 11, 2002 and RUB from March 29, 2004 onwards. Also the following 
observations are removed from the sample due to large failures of covered interest parity: MYR from 
August 1998 to June 2005; IDR from December 2000 to May 2007; TRY from October 2000 to 
November 2001. 
                                                           
7
 Doukas and Zhang (2013) show that NDF carry trades are driven by deviations from covered interest parity due to 
currency convertibility restrictions and capital controls. 
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4.2. Currency excess returns and carry portfolios 
The carry trade strategy where one borrows in low interest rate currencies and invests in high 
interest rate currencies can also be implemented using only spot and forward exchange rate 
contracts (see, e.g., Galati et al., 2007). There are some practical benefits for using forward 
currency markets instead of Treasury bill markets. In forward currency markets the carry trade is 
easy to implement and the contracts are subject to minimal default and counter-party risk (Lustig 
et al., 2011). The downside of forward currency market is that it only exists for a limited set of 
currencies and shorter time periods.  
The empirical analysis is carried out at monthly frequency using end-of-month values. Following 
Fama (1984), I use logarithms of spot and forward exchange rates for ease of exposition and 
notation. I denote the log of the spot exchange rate in units of investment currency per funding 
currency at time t by , and the log of the forward exchange rate in units of investment currency 
per funding currency at time t by . So, when s increases the funding currency appreciates. The 
monthly excess return * on buying an investment currency in the forward market and then 
selling it in the spot market after one month is: 
 * =  −  (7) 
The excess return can also be written as the log forward discount minus the rate of depreciation: 
 * =  −  − ∆ (8) 
where ∆ =  − . Akram, Rime and Sarno (2008) show that covered interest rate parity 
holds closely at daily and lower frequencies, indicating that the forward discount is equivalent on 
interest rate differential:  −  ≈ ∗ − . Accordingly, the log currency excess return equals 
approximately the interest rate differential less the rate of depreciation: 
 * ≈ ∗ −  − ∆ (9) 
As discussed in Section 2.1., the failure of UIP makes the carry trade profitable on average. 
According to UIP, the expected excess return from the carry trade should be zero because the 
forward discount (or interest rate differential) reflects the expected depreciation of the investment 
currency against the funding currency. However, contrary to expectations, investment currencies 
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tend to appreciate against funding currencies on average. Knowing this, a speculator could try to 
maximize his excess returns by finding a currency pair with largest forward discount, as he would 
earn that differential and also benefit from the investment currency appreciation during the 
holding period. 
Following Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), I form portfolios by sorting the sample currencies based 
on their forward discount. My strategy is to borrow (invest in) the currency with the smallest 
(largest) forward discount within its own region. I denote this long-short strategy by HmL (High-
minus-Low). For robustness purposes, I also consider an alternative HmL3 strategy for EMEA 
and Asia Pacific regions. In this strategy I go long (short) in the three currencies with the three 
largest (smallest) forward discounts. In Americas region, where there are only three sample 
currencies, HmL3 strategy is not possible to implement. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end 
of every month.  
During my sample period, Swiss franc, Japanese yen and United States dollar were typically 
considered the standard funding currencies in their own regions. Turkish lira, South-African rand 
and Hungarian forint were some of the major investment currencies in EMEA. They were all 
included in the HmL3 portfolio over 85% of the time. Moreover, Turkish lira was investment 
currency approximately 80% of the time in HmL portfolio. In Asia Pacific, I went long mainly in 
Indian rupee, Indonesian rupiah, New Zealand dollar and Philippine peso. In Americas, Mexican 
peso was investment currency during the whole sample period. Table A.1 in Appendix A shows 
the breakdown of the carry portfolios’ funding and investment currencies.  
4.3. Risk measures 
The risk measures used in this study are equivalent to the funding liquidity measures in 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009). They find that decrease in global risk appetite, measured by VIX 
implied volatility, coincides with reductions in speculator carry positions and carry trade losses. 
Furthermore, they show that an increase in the TED spread leads to tightening funding liquidity 
and has similar effects than increase in the VIX although with less statistical power. Where 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) use only U.S. based funding liquidity measures in their study, I argue 
that the key volatility measures and liquidity spreads of the other two major funding countries, 
Switzerland and Japan, have higher explanatory power for the carry trade returns in their own 
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regions. To examine this, I have selected one key volatility measure and liquidity spread from 
each main funding country. 
4.3.1. Volatility measures 
Changes in implied volatility measures for options can be interpreted as changes in investors’ risk 
appetite. When the volatility measure gets higher values investors become more risk averse. In 
the model of Brunnermeier et al. (2009), fall in the general risk appetite would lead to decreased 
speculation in the currency market and carry trade losses as investors unwind their carry trade 
positions. To capture the changes in investors’ risk aversion in different regions, I use the 
following three volatility measures: CBOE Market Volatility Index – VIX, Volatility Index on 
the Swiss Market Index (SMI) – VSMI, and Volatility Index Japan – VXJ.  
VIX measures market expectation of near term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 index option 
prices. It is commonly used measure of risk aversion and market volatility in the U.S. While the 
VIX is clearly one of the most important volatility measures in Americas, it is also considered to 
be the premier barometer of investor sentiment in the whole world. The daily values for VIX are 
retrieved from CBOE website.8  
VSMI model uses the implicit variances of all Eurex-traded SMI options of the same duration to 
measure the pure volatility in the market. It is a tool that enables investors to monitor anticipated 
fluctuations in the SMI index over the next month. As Switzerland is the main funding country in 
EMEA, the VSMI should also be the key measure of funding liquidity in that region. The daily 
data for the VSMI is available via the SIX Swiss Exchange website.9  
VXJ is a model-free index of market volatility implicit in the bid and asked prices of Nikkei225 
options traded at the Osaka Securities Exchange. It provides a measure of how volatile the 
Japanese stock market will be over the next month. As Japan is the main funding country in Asia 
Pacific, VXJ should also be the key measure of funding liquidity in that region. The data for VXJ 
is available from Osaka University’s Center for the Study of Finance and Insurance website.10 
                                                           
8
 http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx 
9
 http://www.six-swiss-exchange.com/indices/data_centre/strategy_indices/vsmi_en.html 
10
 http://www-csfi.sigmath.es.osaka-u.ac.jp/en/activity/vxj_download.php? 
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4.3.2. Liquidity spreads 
The interest rate difference between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month Treasury bill, known as TED 
spread, is a commonly used indicator of liquidity in interbank markets. LIBOR rate indicates the 
uncollateralized lending in the interbank market, while the Treasury bill rate is considered to be 
riskless since it is guaranteed by the government. When banks face liquidity problems, the TED 
spread generally increases. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) show that a rise in the TED spread is 
correlated with carry trade losses also with one week delay. The negative correlation between 
liquidity spreads and carry trade returns would provide a strong link to the model of liquidity 
friction from Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
To capture the tightening liquidity in the different regions, I compute the TED spreads for U.S., 
Switzerland and Japan. In order to separate these three liquidity spreads, I denote Swiss TED 
spread by S-TED and Japanese TED spread by J-TED.  The spreads are calculated as 
 ,( = -./01 − 2/.-- (10) 
where -./01 is the 3-month LIBOR rate and 2/.-- is the 3-month Treasury bill rate. In the 
United States, TED is the difference between 3-month USD LIBOR and 3-month U.S. Treasury 
bill. S-TED is the spread between the 3-month CHF LIBOR and Switzerland’s 3-month federal 
money market debt register claims, and J-TED is the spread between the 3-month JPY LIBOR 
and the Japanese Government 3-month Bill. I obtain the interest rates for 3-month LIBOR and 3-
month government debt for U.S., Switzerland and Japan from Datastream.  
4.3.3. Correlation between the regional risk measures 
Table 3 shows the correlation between the risk measures during the sample period. Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) find that there is a high level of market co-movement in all states of the world, 
not only during the crises. As one could expect, also the volatility measures of the main funding 
countries are highly correlated. The end of the month values of VSMI and VXJ have correlation 
of 0.78, while the correlation between VIX and the other two volatility measures is over 0.80 
during the sample period. 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix of key variables 
This table shows the correlation between the key variables in my study. I use end of the month 
values and the sample period spans from 1/1999 to 1/2014. VSMI, VXJ and VIX are the key 
volatility measures in Switzerland, Japan and USA, respectively. They are all constructed 
from options on their main stock exchange indices and represent a measure of how volatile the 
stock market will be over the next month. S-TED, J-TED and TED are the differences 
between the interest rates on 3-month interbank loans and 3-month government debt in 
Switzerland, Japan and USA, respectively. These spreads indicate the liquidity in the 
interbank market.  
 
 
VSMI VXJ VIX S-TED J-TED TED 
 
 
VSMI 1.00 
    
VXJ 0.78 1.00 
   
 
VIX 0.88 0.81 1.00 
  
 
S-TED 0.45 0.53 0.46 1.00 
 
 
J-TED 0.31 0.41 0.49 0.42 1.00  
TED 0.37 0.46 0.43 0.76 0.35 1.00 
 
 
Also the liquidity spreads from Switzerland and the United States seem to move together, with a 
coefficient of 0.76. On the other hand, J-TED is only weakly correlated with S-TED and TED. 
This is partly do the fact that the spread between the 3-month JPY LIBOR and the Japanese 
Government 3-month Bill has been rather flat during the sample period compared to noticeably 
more volatile TED spreads in Switzerland and in the United States. Moreover, the correlation 
between the key volatility measure and liquidity spread is between 0.41 and 0.45 in all regions. 
This would imply that shocks that lead to increased risk aversion or liquidity problems in the 
banking sector do not necessarily occur simultaneously. Therefore, it is good to examine the 
volatility measures’ and liquidity spreads’ explanatory power for carry trade returns both 
separately and also at the same time. 
4.4. Methodology 
First, to test whether the carry trade returns are related to volatility measures and liquidity spreads 
introduced above, I estimate the following univariate regression model for each portfolio j: 
 
*3 = 3 + 345 + 63 (11) 
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Where I consider a given risk measure, 45 = 7859, 8;<, 89;, – ,(, <– ,( , ,(>, 
separately for portfolio j at time t.	63 is the error term, and other variables are as defined 
previously. Besides the level of	45 at the end of period t+1, I also test the explanatory power of 
the change in risk measure during the 1-month period defined as: ?45 = 45 − 45. If 
the coefficient 3 is significant, then there is a risk-return relationship between that particular 
risk measure and portfolio j carry trade returns. 
My preliminary analysis indicates that the correlation between the key volatility measures is quite 
high. Therefore, I estimate a regression with one of the volatility measures as the dependent 
variable and the other two as the independent variables. I use the residuals of the regression as 
my orthogonal variable in the regression analysis to test the key volatility measure’s explanatory 
power in its own region on top of the other two volatility measures. If the orthogonal variable is 
statistically significant it indicates that the underlying volatility measure is the most dominant 
risk factor in that region.   
Next, I allow carry trade risk premium to stem from different risk measures at the same time. I 
use the following multivariable model to test which of the funding liquidity measures of the main 
funding country explain the currency excess returns in that region.  
 
*3 = 3 + 3?85@ + 3A85@ + 3B?C@ + 3DC@ + 63 (12) 
Where 85@ = E859, 8;<,	89;> is the key volatility measure in region m at time t, and 
C@ = 7	–,( , <– ,( ,	,(> is the liquidity spread in region m at time t. Furthermore, I 
investigate whether the risk measures have also non-contemporaneous relationship to currency 
excess returns. I do this by adding 1-period lagged explanatory variables to equation (12).  
To test the hypothesis that tightening of funding conditions in the main funding country are 
associated with currency crashes in the investment countries in that region, I estimate a probit 
model where the dependent variable takes value 1 if crash happens, and 0 otherwise. I define a 
crash (denoted by Y), when the monthly return of carry portfolio is lower than (minus) 1 standard 
deviation of its returns during the whole sample period. 
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 F = 	 G1			if	*3 <	*3̅ − 1((*3)0			otherwize																				 (13) 
In the probit model the probability of a crisis is a non-linear function of the indicators: 
 Pr(F = 1|;) = U(;V) (14) 
Where Pr denotes probability, Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution and X is the 
vector of the explanatory variables introduced above. Statistically significant positive coefficients 
would imply that increase in the funding liquidity risk indeed lead to a higher likelihood of 
currency crashes. 
I use robust standard errors in all regression models and the reported R2 values are adjusted R2s. 
There are a total of 181 monthly returns per carry portfolio, but because of the data limitations 
discussed earlier, not all the currencies have 181 months of data. The empirical results are 
presented in the next chapter. 
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5. Analysis and results 
This section presents the empirical results relating to the risk factors behind currency carry trade 
excess returns. First, I describe the summary statistics of the carry portfolios’ excess returns. 
Next, I study the risk-return relationship between the main funding countries’ liquidity measures 
and regional carry trade returns. This is done by first examining separately the characteristics of 
key volatility measures and liquidity spreads, and then combining them in a multivariable 
regression model. Furthermore, I show the link between currency crashes in major investment 
countries and the key risk variables in those regions.  
5.1. Summary of currency carry trade returns 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the summary statistics of carry portfolios’ monthly excess returns for 
the entire sample period, 1/1999-1/2014. For each portfolio, the average change in spot exchange 
rate is lower than the average forward discount, implying a positive mean return from the carry 
trade strategy. Contrary to earlier studies that have used mainly major currencies from developed 
countries, I find that the average change in spot rate is positive for the carry portfolios. This gives 
some support to Frankel and Poonawala’s (2010) argument that the forward market in emerging 
currencies is less biased than in major currencies, as most of the investment currencies in my 
portfolios are from emerging markets. Another thing possibly explaining the less biased forward 
rates is that I use relatively recent dataset. The studies that find the exchange rate to move in the 
opposite direction from what the forward rate predicts have usually a sample period starting from 
70s or 80s. This result is consistent with the findings of Jylhä and Suominen (2011), who state 
that carry trade returns have decreased over time. Moreover, the financial crisis during 8/2007-
3/2009 had a negative effect to the carry trade returns. Panel B shows that, when excluding the 
financial crisis period, the average change in spot rate is close to zero or even negative for Asia 
Pacific and Americas, but still significantly positive for EMEA. 
The average monthly returns are positive for every portfolio and the HmL strategy in EMEA 
generates the largest mean profit; 1.08% per month or 12.97% per year. It has also the highest 
annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.78. The large excess returns stem from the long-short positions in 
TRY/CHF, which is the prevailing currency pair 80% of the time in the HmL portfolio in EMEA. 
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Table 4: Monthly carry trade returns 
This table reports the summary statistics of the monthly returns for the carry trade portfolios, including mean, 
standard deviation (SD), skewness, kurtosis, annualized Sharpe ratio (SR) and median. The log currency excess 
returns are compute by subtracting the change in spot exchange rates from the forward discount: * = ( −) − ∆. The currency portfolios are formed by first sorting the currencies in three different geographical 
regions. In HmL strategy, I borrow (invest in) the currency with the smallest (largest) forward discount. HmL3 
follows the same principle, but instead of one currency I go long (short) in the three currencies with the three 
largest (smallest) forward discounts. Data are monthly, from Barclays and Reuters (Datastream). Panel A reports 
the data for full sample period from 1/1999 to 1/2014. Panel B excludes the financial crisis (8/2007 – 3/2009) 
from the sample. All moments are reported in percentage points. 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
Portfolios 
 EMEA    Asia Pacific    Americas 
     
HmL HmL3   HmL HmL3   HmL 
 
 
Forward discount 1.819 0.992   0.838 0.526   0.552 
SD 1.638 0.653   0.841 0.322   0.398 
Spot change 0.738 0.563   0.212 0.108   0.284 
SD 4.651 2.850   4.460 2.125   3.022 
                
Mean 1.081 0.429   0.626 0.418   0.267 
SD 4.776 2.918   4.591 2.160   3.078 
Skewness -0.503 -0.355   0.089 -1.243   -0.774 
Kurtosis 5.905 4.573   5.329 7.480   5.820 
Annualized SR 0.784 0.509   0.473 0.670   0.301 
Median 1.528 0.717   0.821 0.710   0.327 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Panel B: Full sample excl. financial crisis (8/2007-3/2009) 
 
Portfolios 
 EMEA    Asia Pacific    Americas 
     
HmL HmL3   HmL HmL3   HmL 
 
 
Forward discount 1.876 0.994   0.850 0.521   0.562 
SD 1.722 0.670   0.876 0.335   0.411 
Spot change 0.671 0.457   0.012 -0.092   0.095 
SD 4.319 2.555   4.278 1.791   2.759 
                
Mean 1.205 0.537   0.838 0.613   0.467 
SD 4.449 2.655   4.405 1.835   2.826 
Skewness -0.307 -0.308   0.325 -0.380   -0.480 
Kurtosis 6.692 5.181   5.892 3.766   4.752 
Annualized SR 0.939 0.701   0.659 1.158   0.573 
Median 1.481 0.717   0.826 0.770   0.407 
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The HmL portfolio in Americas has the lowest average return; 0.27% per month or 3.21% per 
year. One reason for the poor performance of Americas compared to other regions is that it has 
only three sample currencies of which Mexican peso is the investment currency during the whole 
sample period. 
Burnside et al. (2008) report, the average excess return of close to five percent for a simple carry 
trade strategy based on up to 20 currencies and executed monthly over the period 1976-2007. I 
find similar average monthly returns for my HmL3 portfolios, while the returns of HmL 
portfolios are higher in EMEA and Asia Pacific, and lower in Americas. More surprisingly, 
Burnside et al. (2008) observe an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.97 for the carry trade returns, 
which is more than double that of the value-weighted US stock market over the same period. I do 
not find as high level of annualized Sharpe ratio during my full sample period, but when the latest 
financial crisis is excluded, the average returns of the portfolios go up and standard deviation 
down, leading to higher Sharpe ratios in Panel B. 
In addition, we can see that the HmL3 portfolios are less volatile than the HmL portfolios in the 
same region. Figure 3 in Appendix B shows the monthly currency excess returns for the carry 
portfolios. There are similarities in the monthly returns patterns of HmL and HmL3 portfolios’ in 
the same region though HmL produces more extreme values. The correlation coefficient between 
HmL and HmL3 portfolios is 0.80 in EMEA and 0.78 in Asia Pacific. Moreover, there is no 
remarkable correlation between the monthly excess returns of carry portfolios’ in EMEA, Asia 
Pacific and Americas. These findings would suggest that large movements in major investment 
currencies have been somewhat regional.  
Although carry trade is profitable on average, the exchange rate speculation is often viewed as 
being especially risky in that the carry portfolios have crash risk (negative skeweness) and fat-
tailed distributions (excess kurtosis). The skewness varies between the carry portfolios being 
most negative for HmL3 in Asia Pacific and even slightly positive for HmL in Asia Pacific. All 
the carry portfolios have fat tails. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) state that the negative skewness or 
excess kurtosis cannot be diversified away by adding more currencies to the carry trade portfolio. 
I also do not find any evidence that this could be done at least with the simple equal-weighted 
portfolio strategy I use in my study. The skewness of HmL3 portfolio in EMEA is only slightly 
less negative than the skewness of HmL portfolio, and the crash risk of HmL3 portfolio in Asia 
32 
 
Pacific is noticeably higher compared to HmL portfolio. The fact that skewness of the carry 
portfolios excess returns cannot be easily diversified away by adding more currencies suggests 
that currency crashes are correlated across different investment countries in the same region. The 
relationship between the regional liquidity risk factors and currency crashes is examined more 
detailed in Section 5.3. 
5.2. Regional carry trade returns and funding liquidity measures   
In this subsection, I test the hypothesis that the main funding countries’ key volatility measures 
and liquidity spreads have the highest explanatory power for carry trade returns in their own 
regions. First, the key volatility measures’ and liquidity spreads’ relationship to currency excess 
returns are examined separately. Thereafter the risk behind carry trade returns is allowed to stem 
from multiple risk factors at the same time. 
5.2.1. Risk aversion in the main funding countries 
I find that all the volatility measures are negatively contemporaneously correlated with currency 
excess returns, indicating carry trade losses during the months when investors’ risk aversion 
increase. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) reports similar results for VIX using weekly data from eight 
developed markets. In order to test the home bias in carry trades, I compare the explanatory 
power of VSMI, VXJ, and VIX for the carry portfolios’ excess returns in EMEA, Asia Pacific, 
and Americas. Results stating that the main funding country’s volatility measure is the most 
dominant in that region provide evidence for the regionality.    
Table C.1 in Appendix C displays the results from the univariate regression between the main 
funding countries’ volatility measures and the monthly excess returns of carry portfolios in 
different regions. In vast majority of the cases the change in the volatility measure during the one 
month period has a much larger explanatory power for the carry trade returns than the 
contemporaneous level. VXJ is somewhat an exemption, as it seems to be a more relevant risk 
factor than ∆VXJ when explaining the carry returns in Asia Pacific. However, this is mainly due 
to the latest financial crisis, as Panel B shows that the level of VXJ loses most of its explanatory 
power when the crisis period is excluded. This is not only case for VXJ as also the level of VSMI 
and VIX seem to lose their meaningfulness in Panel B. Figure 1, shows the end of the month 
values for the key volatility measures during the sample period. The level of volatility measures 
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peaked remarkably high during the financial crisis, explaining the high correlation of the carry 
trade returns and the explanatory variable during that time. For instance, VXJ recorded a value as 
high as 96.7 in the end of October, 2008, compared to long time average of 26.2.  
 
Figure 1: Level of key volatility measures. This figure shows end of the month values for the key volatility 
measures during the sample period of 1/1999-1/2014. VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index, VSMI is the volatility 
index on the SMI, and VXJ is the Volatility Index Japan. These measures represent market’s expectations how 
volatile the stock market will be over the next month. 
 
Unlike the level of the volatility measures, the change variables do not lose their explanatory 
power when the financial crisis period is excluded. In EMEA and Americas the values of 
∆VSMI, ∆VXJ and ∆VIX stay almost the same in Panel B. In Asia Pacific, the variables have 
lower R2 values but are still statistically significant. These finding would suggest the change in 
the volatility measure to be more relevant risk factor than the level, but in the times of large 
financial distress the level becomes also significant. 
Table C.1 gives initial evidence to support the hypothesis that the key volatility measures of the 
main funding countries have the highest explanatory power for the carry trade returns in their 
own regions. In EMEA, the ∆VSMI has clearly highest adjusted R2; 17.7% in HmL portfolio and 
20.4% in HmL3 portfolio. Also in Americas, the ∆VIX explains 19.8% of the HmL strategy 
returns, dominating all the other variables. In the Asia Pacific region, the results of the univariate 
regression do not fully support my hypothesis, as the ∆VIX have larger adjusted R2 values than 
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∆VXJ in both HmL and HmL3 portfolios. However, the level of VXJ is almost as large as ∆VIX 
for HmL3 in Panel A, but as discussed earlier it loses its meaningfulness when the latest financial 
crisis period is excluded from the sample.  
As the volatility measures are highly correlated, I also run a regression with one of the volatility 
measures as the dependent variable and the other two as the independent variables, and use the 
residuals of the regression as my orthogonal explanatory variable. Table 5 reports the 
orthogonalized values for ∆VSMI, ∆VXJ and ∆VIX. Even when taking into consideration the 
changes in VXJ and VIX, the o∆VSMI have adjusted R2 values of 11.1% and 5.2% for HmL and 
HmL3 portfolios respectively. The o∆VXJ and o∆VIX do not have any explanatory power for 
the carry trade returns in EMEA, providing evidence that the ∆VSMI is the most dominant 
explanatory variable in the region. In Americas, o∆VIX is the only significant variable with 
adjusted R2 value of 5.08%. The o∆VIX is also most dominant explanatory variable in Asia 
Pacific, confirming the relevance of ∆VIX in that region.  
 
Table 5: Orthogonal volatility measure variables 
This table documents the contemporaneous relationship between orthogonal volatility measure variables and carry 
portfolios’ monthly excess returns in different regions. The orthogonal variables are constructed by regressing the 
volatility measure on the other two volatility measures of main funding countries and using the residuals from that 
regression. VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index, VSMI is the volatility index on the SMI, and VXJ is the Volatility 
Index Japan. The change variables are denoted by delta (∆). In HmL strategy, I borrow (invest in) the currency with 
the smallest (largest) forward discount. HmL3 follows the same principle, but instead of one currency I go long 
(short) in the three currencies with the three largest (smallest) forward discounts. The t-statistics are computed using 
robust standard errors and ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level 
respectively. The reported R2 values are adjusted R2s. Data are monthly and the sample period is 1/1999 – 1/2014. 
Only significant values are shown in the table. 
 
  
EMEA   Asia Pacific   Americas 
      
  
HmL   HmL3   HmL   HmL3   HmL 
         
Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat 
 
 
o∆VSMI -0.6218*** -4.47   -0.2667*** -2.64   –––   –––   ––– 
o∆VXJ –––   –––   –––   –––   ––– 
o∆VIX –––  –––  -0.3817*** -2.97  -0.1776*** -2.68  -0.2692** -2.47 
                          
  
const.  1.0809***  3.23    0.4289**  2.03    0.6263*  1.88    0.4180***  2.66    0.2672  1.20 
                              
Adj. R2 11.07 %   5.17 %   4.53 %   4.42 %   5.08 % 
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One reason why ∆VIX seems to be a better risk measure in Asia Pacific than ∆VXJ could be that 
the USD is actually more popular funding currency for the major investment countries in the 
region than JPY during my sample period. Long-short positions in INR/USD, PHP/USD, 
IDR/USD, and NZD/USD are not uncommon at all. This interpretation of the findings would 
fight against my hypothesis of regionality in carry trade. It might also be that the VXJ is not the 
most optimal funding liquidity measure in the region as Ferreira Filipe and Suominen (2013) 
show that their measure of funding risk in Japan leaves the U.S. measures redundant. However, 
their sample included only developed countries while the major investment countries in my 
sample are most of the time emerging countries.  
In order to examine more closely the risk factors behind the carry trade excess returns in Asia 
Pacific, I also include one month lagged values of ∆VXJ and ∆VIX in the regressions due to the 
slow moving capital. Table 6 presents the empirical results of this regression for HmL and HmL3 
portfolios in Asia Pacific. The 1-period lagged ∆VXJ is statistically significant in both portfolios 
together with the contemporaneous level and change in VXJ, while the VIX variables have only 
contemporaneous relationship with carry trade returns. The Japan based volatility measures can 
explain 11.1% of the currency excess returns in HmL portfolio and 29.0% in HmL3 portfolio. 
Similarly, the R2 values for U.S. based volatility measures are 14.5% and 27.4% in HmL and 
HmL3 portfolios respectively.    
The results would suggest that ∆VIX has larger contemporaneous effect while ∆VXJ is a better 
measure when predicting the carry trade returns one month ahead in Asia Pacific region. One 
possible explanation for this is that large amount of Japanese retail investors participate in 
currency carry trades. The professional investors in U.S., with highly leveraged large carry 
positions, have to react fast to tightening funding liquidity as they hit the funding constraints. In 
Japan, however, the collective action of numerous retail investors is slower explaining why part 
of the effect of increasing risk aversion to carry returns comes with delay. Ferreira Filipe and 
Suominen (2013) also argue that the popularity of carry trades amongst the Japanese retail 
investors is large enough to influence the global currency markets. Using stock market crash risk 
in Japan, they find the unexpected component of risk to be statistically significant when 
explaining the carry trade returns up to three months ahead. The predictive power of the key 
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volatility measures one month ahead are not significant in EMEA and Americas, and are 
therefore not separately displayed in this thesis.  
The fact that the lagged ∆VXJ is only statistically significant in Asia Pacific suggests that the 
Japanese retail investors participate in carry trades mainly in their own region. This gives support 
to the home bias in carry trade in Asia Pacific even though the U.S. based volatility measures 
have approximately the same explanatory power for the excess returns in both portfolios. In 
EMEA and Americas the main funding countries’ key volatility measures provide more explicit 
evidence for the regionality hypothesis. 
 
Table 6: Carry trade returns and volatility measures in Asia Pacific 
This table shows the explanatory power of volatility measures in Japan and U.S. for the monthly carry 
trade returns in Asia Pacific region. The changes in the volatility measures are both contemporaneous and 
lagged. VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index and VXJ is the Volatility Index Japan. The change variables are 
denoted by delta (∆). In HmL strategy, I borrow (invest in) the currency with the smallest (largest) forward 
discount. HmL3 follows the same principle, but instead of one currency I go long (short) in the three 
currencies with the three largest (smallest) forward discounts. The t-statistics are computed using robust 
standard errors and ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level 
respectively. The reported R2 values are adjusted R2s. Data are monthly and the sample period is 1/1999 – 
1/2014. 
 
  
HmL   HmL   HmL3   HmL3 
       
Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat 
 
 
VXJ                       
L0. -0.0818*** -2.65   –––   -0.0691*** -3.75   ––– 
                        
∆VXJ                       
L0. -0.1521*** -3.46   –––   -0.1022*** -4.14   ––– 
L1. -0.0896** -2.08   –––   -0.0554** -2.09   ––– 
                        
VIX                       
L0. –––   -0.0735** -2.11   –––   -0.0548** -2.44 
                        
∆VIX                       
L0. –––   -0.3393*** -5.65   –––   -0.1973*** -5.40 
L1. –––   -0.0790 -1.06   –––   -0.0645 -1.44 
                        
const.  2.7276***  3.08    2.1956***  2.87    2.1938***  4.62    1.5894***  3.43 
                        
Adj. R2 11.06 %   14.45 %   28.98 %   27.37 % 
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5.2.2. Liquidity in the interbank markets 
Here I use the TED spreads in Switzerland, Japan and U.S. to test how the tightening liquidity in 
the interbank market affects the carry trade returns in EMEA, Asia Pacific and Americas. When 
significant, the negative coefficients of the TED spreads indicate that when banks face liquidity 
problems the carry portfolios experience losses. The results on the liquidity spreads are not as 
consistent as the findings related to the volatility measures discussed above. I find the liquidity 
spreads to be statistically less significant than the volatility measures and their explanatory power 
varies in different regions. 
Table C.2 in Appendix C displays the contemporaneous relationship between the main funding 
countries’ liquidity spreads and the monthly excess returns of carry portfolios in different 
regions. Overall, the results indicate that the level is more important factor than the change in the 
spread. Surprisingly, none of the variables are statistically significant in EMEA, implying that the 
liquidity spreads are not a risk factor at all in that region. Moreover, in Asia Pacific S-TED and 
TED are statistically significant while J-TED does not have any explanatory power for currency 
excess returns. The R2 value of S-TED is 6.3% in HmL portfolio and 15.2% in HmL3 portfolio. 
TED has slightly lower R2 values of 3.0% and 12.1% in HmL and HmL3 portfolios respectively. 
Also in Americas S-TED has higher explanatory power for the carry returns compared to TED 
(9.8% vs 5.4%), and J-TED remains insignificant. 
Figure 2 shows the end of the month values of the liquidity spreads during my sample period. As 
we can see, J-TED has been staying quite flat compared to TED and S-TED, partly explaining its 
poor performance as a risk measure for highly volatile carry trade returns. TED and S-TED are 
correlated with each other and have higher variances than J-TED. They both also record some 
extreme values during the latest financial crises. In fact, if the crisis period is excluded from the 
sample, the TED spreads in every funding country lose their statistical significance.    
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Figure 2: Level of liquidity spreads. This figure shows end of the month values for the liquidity spreads during the 
sample period of 1/1999-1/2014. TED is the spread between the 3-month USD LIBOR and the 3-month U.S. T-Bill 
rate. S-TED is the spread between the 3-month CHF LIBOR and Switzerland’s 3-month federal money market debt 
register claims. J-TED is the spread between the 3-month JPY LIBOR and the Japanese Government 3-month Bill. 
These spreads are indicators of liquidity in interbank markets. 
 
The results from the univaritate regression would suggest that the contemporaneous level of 
liquidity spreads is only a relevant risk measure during the times of large financial distress. 
However, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) report that the change in TED has a stronger predictive 
relationship to the carry trade return in one week ahead, and a smaller contemporaneous effect. In 
order to test if the changes in the liquidity spreads have delayed effect on currency excess returns, 
I also include one month lagged values of ∆TED, ∆S-TED and ∆J-TED to the regression. 
Table 7 presents the empirical results of this regression for HmL portfolio in Americas. I find the 
1-period lagged ∆TED to have strong predictive power for the carry trade returns together with 
the contemporaneous level of TED. The adjusted R2 value of the regression is 9.9%. From 
Switzerland based liquidity spread measures, only the current level of S-TED is statistically 
significant and explain 9.5% of the currency excess returns. Further, both the current and lagged 
values of ∆J-TED are significant but with lower adjusted R2 value of 4.9%.  
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Table 7: Carry trade returns and liquidity spreads in Americas 
This table shows the explanatory power of the main funding countries’ liquidity spreads for 
the monthly carry trade returns in Americas. The changes in the liquidity spreads are both 
contemporaneous and lagged. TED, S-TED and J-TED are the differences between 3-month 
LIBOR and 3-month Treasury bill in U.S., Switzerland and Japan, respectively. The change 
variables are denoted by delta (∆). In HmL strategy, I borrow (invest in) the currency with 
the smallest (largest) forward discount. The t-statistics are computed using robust standard 
errors and ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence 
level respectively. The reported R2 values are adjusted R2s. Data are monthly and the 
sample period is 1/1999 – 1/2014. 
 
  
HmL   HmL   HmL   
      
Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat   
 
 
TED                   
L0. -1.2522** -2.14   –––   –––   
                    
∆TED                   
L0. -0. 5158 -0.54   –––   –––   
L1. -2.9456** -2.42   –––   –––   
                    
S-TED                   
L0. –––   -2.4557*** -2.89   –––   
                    
∆S-TED                   
L0. –––    0.0442  0.04   –––   
L1. –––   -1.1345 -0.75   –––   
                    
J-TED          
L0. –––  –––  -0.7563 -0.33  
                 
∆J-TED                
L0. –––  –––  -17.3406** -2.40  
L1. –––  –––  -9.2794* -1.93  
          
const.  0. 8719**  2.57    1.0063***  3.49    0.3732  0.93   
                    
Adj. R2 9.92 %   9.52 %   4.93 %   
 
 
As the end of the month values of TED and S-TED are highly correlated during the sample 
period, it is somewhat expected that also S-TED is a significant risk factor in Americas. The 
result that the coefficient of 1-period lagged ∆TED is negative and statistically significant 
supports Brunnermeier et al. (2009) finding that the changes in TED spread have delayed effect 
on carry trade returns. However, the results from Americas do not apply for the other regions. 
One month lagged changes in the liquidity spreads are not statistically significant in EMEA and 
40 
 
Asia Pacific. The reason for this might be that one month lag is too long time period in general, 
to capture the effect of tightening funding liquidity to carry trade returns. Nevertheless, Ferreira 
Filipe and Suominen (2013) argue that the TED spread is not the most optimal risk measure even 
for the weekly carry trade activity in AUD/JPY. This finding, together with the fact that the 
contemporaneous levels or changes in the liquidity spreads do not have any explanatory power 
over the carry trade returns in EMEA, suggest that the TED spreads are not a relevant risk factor 
in every region.  
5.2.3. Regional funding liquidity risk 
Next, I test the relationship between the main funding country’s liquidity measures and the carry 
portfolios’ excess returns in that region by allowing the funding liquidity risk behind the carry 
trade returns to stem from both the volatility measures and liquidity spreads simultaneously. The 
results provide more insight on which of the risk factors are the most dominant in EMEA, Asia 
Pacific and Americas. In general, I find strong evidence supporting the regional volatility 
measures while liquidity spreads seem to be more relevant risk factors during times of financial 
distress.   
Table 8 reports the result of the regression between main funding countries’ liquidity measures 
and carry portfolios’ monthly excess returns in different regions. It is evident that ∆VSMI is the 
most dominant risk measure in EMEA. Inclusion of other measures of funding risk does not 
affect the results. In Asia Pacific, I have also included the contemporaneous U.S. based funding 
liquidity measures to the regression as they seem to be relevant risk factors in that region. For 
HmL3 portfolio, VXJ and ∆VIX are the only statistically significant variables explaining one 
third of the carry trade returns. For HmL portfolio, ∆TED is also statistically significant and 
together with VXJ and ∆VIX they explain 16.3% of the carry trade returns. In Americas, ∆VIX 
and TED are both statistically significant and have adjusted R2 value of 22.2%.  
In Panel B, I present the results for the sample excluding the financial crisis period. The results 
are roughly the same for EMEA and Americas but in Asia Pacific the adjusted R2 drops 
considerably when the recent financial crisis period is excluded from the sample. Also VXJ and 
the TED spreads lose their significance confirming the result that the level of volatility measures 
and liquidity spreads are only relevant risk measures when there is turmoil in financial markets.  
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Table 8: Regional carry trade returns and funding liquidity 
This table documents the contemporaneous relationship between the main funding countries’ liquidity measures and 
carry portfolios’ monthly excess returns in EMEA, Asia Pacific and Americas. VIX, VSMI and VXJ are the main 
volatility indexes and TED, S-TED and J-TED are the differences between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month Treasury 
bill in U.S., Switzerland and Japan, respectively. The change variables are denoted by delta (∆). In HmL strategy, I 
borrow (invest in) the currency with the smallest (largest) forward discount. HmL3 follows the same principle, but 
instead of one currency I go long (short) in the three currencies with the three largest (smallest) forward discounts. 
The t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% confidence level respectively. The reported R2 values are adjusted R2s. Panel A reports the monthly 
data for full sample period from 1/1999 to 1/2014. Panel B excludes the financial crisis (8/2007 – 3/2009). 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
  
EMEA   Asia Pacific   Americas 
      
  
HmL   HmL3   HmL   HmL3   HmL 
         
Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat 
 
 
VSMI -0.0139 -0.25   -0.0177 -0.59   –––   –––   ––– 
∆VSMI -0.4579*** -4.14   -0.2932*** -4.82   –––   –––   ––– 
                              
VXJ –––   –––   -0.1346* -1.65   -0.0935*** -2.67   ––– 
∆VXJ –––   –––    0.0481  0.64   -0.0029 -0.07   ––– 
  
     
                  
VIX –––   –––    0.0022  0.03    0.0301  0.87 
  
-0.0205 -0.58 
∆VIX –––   –––   -0.3087*** -2.69   -0.1642*** -3.07 
  
-0.2968*** -4.75 
                              
S-TED  0.1284  0.11    0.1104  0.15   –––   ––– 
  
––– 
∆S-TED  0.9359  0.73    0.4139  0.55   –––   ––– 
  
––– 
                  
  
    
  
J-TED –––   –––    3.0202  0.92    0.2708  0.19 
  
––– 
∆J-TED –––   –––   -7.1484 -0.81   -1.3510 -0.37 
  
––– 
  
     
            
  
    
TED –––   –––    0.1245  0.13   -0.6552 -1.62 
  
-1.1577* -1.93 
∆TED –––   –––   -2.9970* -1.93   -0.5431 -0.83 
  
 1.0985  1.19 
                          
  
const.  1.2850  1.27    0.7265  1.35    3.4193***  3.66    2.4357***  4.77    1.2737*  1.91 
                              
Adj. R2 16.65 %   19.46 %   16.31 %   33.13 %   22.18 % 
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Panel B: Full sample excl. financial crisis (8/2007-3/2009) 
 
  
EMEA 
  
Asia Pacific 
  
Americas 
      
  
HmL   HmL3   HmL   HmL3   HmL 
         
Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat 
 
 
VSMI  0.0469  0.96    0.0215  0.82   –––   –––   ––– 
∆VSMI -0.5055*** -4.71   -0.2862*** -4.33   –––   –––   ––– 
                          
  
VXJ –––   –––   -0.0741 -0.87   -0.0565 -1.47   ––– 
∆VXJ –––   –––    0.0817  0.74   -0.0043 -0.08   ––– 
                    
  
      
VIX –––   –––   -0.0289 -0.38    0.0136  0.38 
  
 0.0023  0.06 
∆VIX –––   –––   -0.3160** -2.54   -0.1488*** -2.65 
  
-0.3176*** -5.11 
                              
S-TED  2.5148  1.05    1.0526  0.65   –––   ––– 
  
––– 
∆S-TED -0.0924 -0.04   -0.5806 -0.37   –––   ––– 
  
––– 
                              
J-TED –––   –––    2.4746  0.67   -0.4325 -0.29 
  
––– 
∆J-TED –––   –––   -6.5759 -0.65   -2.6237 -0.71 
  
––– 
                        
  
    
TED –––   –––    0.9568  0.36   -0.4398 -0.52 
  
 0.6397  0.59 
∆TED –––   –––   -3.9012 -1.07   -0.4462 -0.36 
  
-2.5270 -1.28 
                              
const. -0.2808 -0.30   -0.1343 -0.25    2.3864  1.38    1.8907***  2.84    0.1150  0.15 
                              
Adj. R2 17.99 %   16.09 %   5.35 %   8.93 %   17.86 % 
 
 
Overall, I find the changes in the volatility measures to be the most relevant risk factors 
explaining the carry trade returns. Both ∆VSMI and ∆VIX explain around 20% of the carry trade 
returns in their own regions leaving other funding countries’ volatility measures redundant. In 
Asia Pacific ∆VIX has larger contemporaneous effect than ∆VXJ, but when one month lagged 
variables are introduced, the Japanese and U.S. volatility measures have both approximately the 
same explanatory power for carry portfolios’ excess returns. In Japan, carry trade is very popular 
among retail investors and their collective actions are slower than those of larger hedge funds, 
explaining why part of the effect of ∆VXJ to carry trade returns comes with delay. The liquidity 
spreads have very limited explanatory power for carry trade returns in the same regression with 
the key volatility measures. Even though the evidence that the main funding countries’ liquidity 
spreads could explain the regional carry trade returns is quite weak, the TED spreads produce 
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more significant results relating to currency crashes, presented in Section 5.3. This is linked to 
the finding that the TED spreads are better measures of funding risk when there is lots of 
turbulence in the market. 
5.3. Currency crashes in the major investment countries 
In this subsection, I test my second hypothesis that the tightening funding conditions in the main 
funding country are associated with currency crashes in the major investment countries in that 
region. When speculators face funding constraints, they are forced to unwind their carry trade 
positions causing the investment currencies to depreciate. This negative shock has spillover 
effects and is amplified as more speculative capital is being withdrawn from the investment 
countries. I define a crash when the monthly return of carry portfolio is lower than (minus) 1 
standard deviation of its returns during the whole sample period. The results from the probit 
model indicate that in addition to the changes in the volatility measures, also the current level and 
the TED spreads have explanatory power over the currency crashes. 
5.3.1. Americas 
Table 9 shows the explanatory power of funding liquidity for currency crashes in Americas. 
Positive values on coefficients indicate that when the risk aversion or TED spreads increases, also 
the probability of crash in the investment currency increases. The results confirm that the U.S. 
based funding liquidity measures are the most significant when explaining currency crashes in 
Americas. The contemporaneous level and change in VIX together with the 1-month lagged 
∆TED can explain 20.6% of the crashes. The fact that also the level of VIX is positive and 
statistically significant implies that the investment currency is more likely to crash when risk 
aversion in U.S. is high. Also, the results relating to one month lagged ∆TED are consistent with 
the earlier findings that the changes in TED spread have delayed effect on carry trade returns in 
Americas. 
As expected, the Swiss and Japanese funding liquidity measures have less explanatory power for 
currency crashes in Americas than the U.S. ones. Switzerland based funding liquidity measures 
have pseudo R2 value of 12.9%, S-TED being the most significant variable, and the Japan based 
measures have the lowest pseudo R2 value of 11.9%, VXJ being the most significant variable. 
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Table 9: Currency crashes and funding liquidity in Americas 
This table shows the explanatory power of funding liquidity for currency crashes in Americas region. I estimate a 
probit model, where the dependent variable takes value 1 if crash happens, and 0 otherwise. I define a crash when the 
monthly return of HmL portfolio is lower than (minus) 1 standard deviation of its returns during the whole sample 
period. VIX, VSMI and VXJ are the main volatility indexes and TED, S-TED and J-TED are the differences between 
3-month LIBOR and 3-month Treasury bill in U.S., Switzerland and Japan, respectively. The change variables are 
denoted by delta (∆). In Model (1), I show that contemporaneous level and change in VIX and also the 1-month 
lagged ∆TED explain currency crashes. Model (2) and (3) show the results for Swiss and Japan based funding 
liquidity measures separately. Model (4) considers all volatility measure variables and Model (5) all liquidity spread 
variables. The z-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and ***, **, and * indicates statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level respectively. The last row shows pseudo-R2s. Returns are monthly 
and the sample period is 1/1999 – 1/2014. 
 
  
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
         
Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat 
 
 
VIX  0.0430**  2.15   –––   –––   -0.0006 -0.01   ––– 
                              
∆VIX  0.1285**  2.05   –––   –––    0.1285***  2.05   ––– 
L1.  0.0541  0.88   –––   –––    0.0541  0.88   ––– 
                              
VSMI –––    0.0245  1.37   –––   -0.0020 -0.05   ––– 
                               
∆VSMI –––    0.0426  1.56   –––   -0.0059 -0.12   ––– 
L1. –––    0.0277  1.09   –––   -0.0161 -0.34   ––– 
                              
VXJ –––   –––   0.0499*** 2.94    0.0441  1.58   ––– 
                              
∆VXJ –––   –––   0.0145 0.62   -0.0535 -1.57   ––– 
L1. –––   –––   0.0071 0.38   -0.0239 -0.69   ––– 
                              
TED  0.4477 1.60   –––   –––   –––   -0.1110 -0.24 
 
                            
∆TED -0.5891 -1.23   –––   –––   –––    0.5857  1.11 
L1.  1.0601* 1.88   –––   –––   –––    1.3155**  2.20 
                              
S-TED –––    0.5950**  2.03   –––   –––    1.0113*  1.67 
                              
∆S-TED –––   -0.2488 -0.56   –––   –––   -0.8668 -1.36 
L1. –––   -0.6597 -1.42   –––   –––   -1.1062* -1.96 
                              
J-TED –––   –––   -0.6392 -0.54   –––   -0.0661 -0.05 
                              
∆J-TED –––   –––    3.1336  0.88   –––   -0.4925 -0.16 
L1. –––   –––    1.3635  0.51   –––   -0.2758 -0.09 
                              
const. -2.4441*** -5.15   -1.8818*** -5.01   -2.3822*** -5.21   -2.3513*** -5.35   -1.4403*** -5.22 
                              
Pseudo R2 20.61 %   12.93 %   11.92 %   18.06 %   10.95 % 
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All in all, the key volatility measures have higher explanatory power for currency crashes than 
the liquidity spreads. The ∆VIX is the most significant volatility measure and 1-period lagged 
∆TED the most significant liquidity spread in Americas. The evidence that USD is the main 
funding currency in its own region is quite substantial, but in order to find out whether the USD 
carry trade activity is actually biased towards Americas or if the USD is just dominant funding 
currency globally, it is also necessary to examine more closely the currency crashes in Asia 
Pacific and EMEA.   
5.3.2. Asia Pacific 
Table 10 shows the explanatory power of funding liquidity for currency crashes in Asia Pacific 
region. As the Japanese funding liquidity measures have some predictive power for the carry 
trade returns one month ahead, I also include 1-period lagged variables to the probit model. First 
I examine separately the Japan and U.S. key volatility measures’ explanatory power for currency 
crashes in the investment countries in HmL3 portfolio. I find that the contemporaneous levels and 
changes in VXJ and VIX are all statistically significant, though the Japanese volatility measures 
have slightly higher pseudo R2 value of 19.4% compared to the U.S 17.9%. This result is 
consistent with the findings in Section 5.2.1, although the volatility measures have less 
explanatory power for currency crashes than carry trade returns in general. The Swiss funding 
liquidity measures are not shown in the table as the Japanese and U.S. variables leave them 
redundant.  
I also test the explanatory Japanese and U.S TED spreads separately. The contemporaneous level 
and 1-period lagged change in J-TED are statistically significant and have pseudo R2 value of 
9.5%. Likewise the ∆TED in Americas, also ∆J-TED have delayed effect on currency crashes in 
Asia Pacific, emphasizing the predictive power of TED spreads. However, the level and change 
in TED can explain 19.1% of the currency crashes in Asia Pacific, so it seems that TED have 
larger contemporaneous effect than J-TED.  
Moreover, the Japanese and U.S. funding liquidity measures can together explain over 40% of the 
crashes in major investment currencies’ in Asia Pacific. I conclude that the U.S. funding liquidity 
measures are also highly relevant in Asia Pacific in addition to the Japanese ones, and investors 
should use the key measures from both countries in order to best explain crashes in this region. 
46 
 
Table 10: Currency crashes and funding liquidity in Asia Pacific 
This table shows the explanatory power of funding liquidity for currency crashes in Asia Pacific region. I estimate a 
probit model, where the dependent variable takes value 1 if crash happens, and 0 otherwise. I define a crash when the 
monthly return of HmL3 portfolio is lower than (minus) 1 standard deviation of its returns during the whole sample 
period. VIX, VSMI and VXJ are the main volatility indexes and TED, S-TED and J-TED are the differences between 
3-month LIBOR and 3-month Treasury bill in U.S., Switzerland and Japan, respectively. The change variables are 
denoted by delta (∆). In Model (1) and (2) I show that contemporaneous levels and changes in VXJ and VIX explain 
currency crashes. Model (3) shows that the level of J-TED and also 1-period lagged ∆VXJ are statistically 
significant. Model (4) shows that the contemporaneous level of TED is more significant than its change. Model (5) 
considers all variables. The z-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and ***, **, and * indicates 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level respectively. The last row shows pseudo-R2s. Returns 
are monthly and the sample period is 1/1999 – 1/2014. 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
         
Coef. z-stat 
 
Coef. z-stat 
 
Coef. z-stat 
 
Coef. z-stat 
 
Coef. z-stat 
 
 
VXJ 
             
L0.  0.0571***  3.99 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
 0.0648  1.38 
               
∆VXJ 
              
L0.  0.0534***  2.64 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
-0.0078 -0.18 
L1.  0.0163  0.88 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
 0.0333  0.76 
               
VIX 
              
L0. ––– 
 
 0.0503***  3.23 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
-0.0075 -0.17 
               
∆VIX 
              
L0. ––– 
 
 0.0783***  2.92 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
 0.1375**  1.97 
L1. ––– 
 
-0.0144 -0.46 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
-0.1134 -1.59 
               
J-TED 
              
L0. ––– 
 
––– 
 
 2.2455**  2.07 
 
––– 
 
 0.7869  0.38 
               
∆J-TED 
              
L0. ––– 
 
––– 
 
 2.6452  0.78 
 
––– 
 
-3.2883 -0.96 
L1. ––– 
 
––– 
 
 8.5991**  2.33 
 
––– 
 
11.7725**  2.43 
               
TED 
              
L0. ––– 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
 1.1620***  4.24    0.6952  1.45 
               
∆TED 
              
L0. ––– 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
 0.8854*  1.81    2.7711***  2.59 
L1. ––– 
 
––– 
 
––– 
 
-0.2578 -0.62    0.3514  0.54 
 
              
const. -2.7798*** -6.60   -2.4210*** -6.32   -1.6451*** -6.70   -1.8489*** -8.21   -3.5704*** -4.76 
               
Pseudo R2 19.44 %   17.92 %   9.45 %   19.08 %   40.81 % 
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5.3.3. EMEA 
Table 11 shows the contemporaneous relationship between main funding countries’ liquidity 
measures and currency crashes in EMEA. The results indicate that when investors become more 
risk averse also the probability of currency crashes in major investment countries increases. TED 
spreads have hardly any explanatory power for the crashes in this region. Even though in other 
regions the changes in the main funding country’s TED spread have delayed effect on currency 
crashes, the lagged variables are not statistically significant in EMEA and are therefore not 
included to the probit model. 
From Switzerland based liquidity measures ∆VSMI is the most significant and can explain 
around 19% of the currency crashes in the HmL3 portfolio. This result is similar to the findings 
when explaining carry trade returns in EMEA. However, the Japan and U.S. based liquidity 
measures produce very much alike probabilities for currency crashes in EMEA than the ∆VSMI. 
The level and change in VXJ have even slightly higher pseudo R2 value of 21.4%; while ∆VIX 
and TED can explain 17.3% of the crashes. Interestingly, VXJ seems to be the most significant 
variable in a probit model where all the volatility measures from each main funding country are 
included to the regression.  
If we compare these results to the ones reported in Section 5.2, the biggest change is that the 
Japanese and U.S funding liquidity measures become more significant when explaining currency 
crashes instead of carry trade returns. One reason for this might be that the large sudden 
depreciation of major investment currencies in EMEA has been driven mainly by global shocks 
which would explain why all the volatility measures produce fairly similar probabilities. As 
∆VSMI is clearly the dominant variable when explaining carry trade returns in EMEA, it is 
reasonable to assume that the crashes are due to the withdraw of speculative CHF capital even 
though at the same time VXJ and VIX have increased.     
Overall, the key volatility measures have much higher explanatory power for currency crashes in 
EMEA than the liquidity spreads. In fact, none of the TED spread variables are statistically 
significant in a probit model that includes the liquidity spreads from each funding country. This 
result is consistent with the earlier findings related to liquidity spreads and carry trade returns in 
EMEA. 
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Taking everything into account it is reasonable to argue that ∆VSMI is the key variable when 
explaining carry trade returns and currency crashes in EMEA. Also the fact, that Switzerland 
based funding liquidity measures are not the most significant ones in the two other regions, 
provides further evidence of home bias in carry trade in EMEA.    
Table 11: Currency crashes and funding liquidity in EMEA 
This table shows the contemporaneous relationship between the main funding countries’ liquidity measures and 
currency crashes in EMEA. I estimate a probit model, where the dependent variable takes value 1 if crash happens, 
and 0 otherwise. I define a crash when the monthly return of HmL3 portfolio is lower than (minus) 1 standard 
deviation of its returns during the whole sample period. VIX, VSMI and VXJ are the main volatility indexes and 
TED, S-TED and J-TED are the differences between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month Treasury bill in U.S., 
Switzerland and Japan, respectively. The change variables are denoted by delta (∆). In Model (1), (2) and (3), I show 
the results for Swiss, Japan and U.S. based funding liquidity measures separately. Model (4) considers all volatility 
measure variables and Model (5) all liquidity spread variables. The z-statistics are computed using robust standard 
errors and ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level respectively. The last 
row shows pseudo-R2s. Returns are monthly and the sample period is 1/1999 – 1/2014. 
 
  
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
         
Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat   Coef. z-stat 
 
 
VSMI  0.0289  1.59   –––   –––    0.0130  0.37   ––– 
∆VSMI  0.0857**  2.39   –––   –––    0.0545  1.08   ––– 
                              
VXJ –––    0.0587***  3.83   –––    0.0883***  3.44   ––– 
∆VXJ –––    0.0675***  3.34   –––   -0.0075 -0.24   ––– 
                              
VIX –––   –––    0.0152  0.89   -0.0526 -1.16   ––– 
∆VIX –––   –––    0.1129***  2.75    0.0766  1.30   ––– 
                              
S-TED  0.6696  1.62   –––   –––   –––    0.5249  1.12 
∆S-TED  0.2686  0.54   –––   –––   –––    0.6618  1.35 
                              
J-TED –––    0.1617  0.13   –––   –––    0.6485  0.53 
∆J-TED –––    4.2093  1.15   –––   –––    0.5608  0.16 
                              
TED –––   –––    0.5982*  1.95   –––    0.2412  0.56 
∆TED –––   –––   -0.5078 -1.03   –––   -0.1314 -0.25 
                              
const. -2.0381*** -5.21   -2.8272*** -6.25   -1.9057*** -4.79   -2.7363*** -5.81   -1.5841*** -5.69 
                              
Pseudo R2 18.95 %   21.24 %   17.34 %   25.20 %   8.97 % 
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6. Conclusions 
The goal of my research is to provide new insight to the forward premium puzzle and arising 
currency carry trade excess returns. I expect the carry trade activity from the main funding 
countries to be biased towards investment countries that are located nearby and thus more 
familiar to investors. Utilizing spot and forward exchange rates of 28 currencies form EMEA, 
Asia Pacific and Americas, I examine the risk-return relationship between the main funding 
countries’ funding liquidity measures and carry trade returns in these three regions. Furthermore, 
I test whether the tightening funding conditions in the main funding country are associated with 
currency crashes in the major investment countries in that region.  
My empirical results provide support to the hypothesis that the main funding countries’ funding 
liquidity measures have the highest explanatory power for carry trade returns in their own 
regions. I find strong evidence that the Swiss franc and the United States dollar are the main 
funding currencies in EMEA and Americas, respectively. The contemporaneous changes in 
VSMI and VIX can both alone explain around 20 percent of currency carry trade returns in their 
own regions, leaving other main funding countries’ volatility measures redundant. In Asia 
Pacific, the changes in VXJ have also delayed effect to carry trade returns due to slow collective 
action of numerous Japanese retail investors. This provides an explanation why VIX has larger 
contemporaneous effect in this region. However, together the funding liquidity measures from 
Japan and U.S. can explain one third of the currency excess returns in Asia Pacific. 
While the liquidity spreads (TED spreads) produce less significant values relating to carry trade 
returns, they prove to be more relevant measures when explaining the currency crashes in the 
major investment countries. This is related to the finding that the TED spreads are better 
measures of funding risk when there is lots of turbulence in the market. The U.S. and Japanese 
TED spreads have also predictive power for the currency crashes one month ahead in Americas 
and Asia Pacific, respectively. However, in EMEA the TED spreads have hardly any 
significance. All in all, the results from a probit model between the funding liquidity measures 
and currency crashes are fairly consistent with the findings relating to regional carry trade 
returns, although, the large sudden depreciation of major investment currencies in EMEA seems 
to happen in times when the risk aversion is high also globally and TED has highly significant 
explanatory power for crashes in Asia Pacific. The Swiss and U.S. funding liquidity measures 
50 
 
can again explain around 20 percent of the currency crashes in EMEA and Americas, 
respectively. Moreover, 40 percent of the crashes in major investment currencies in Asia Pacific 
can be explained with the funding liquidity measures from Japan and U.S. 
The results that the main funding countries’ liquidity measures are the most dominant when 
explaining currency excess returns in their own region indicate a clear home bias in carry trades. 
Investor participating in currency carry trade should pay attention to the changes in Swiss 
volatility measures if the investment country is located in EMEA, and correspondingly, the 
changes in the U.S. volatility measure and the TED spread are most relevant variables if the 
investment country is located in Americas. Moreover, when investing in Asia Pacific, the 
Japanese funding liquidity measures should be accompanied by the U.S. ones. 
My research primarily focuses on the funding liquidity measures of the three main funding 
countries: Switzerland, Japan and the United States. To get an even better understanding how the 
geographical and cultural distance between funding and investment countries affect investors’ 
carry trade activity, the further research could also consider funding liquidity measures of other 
important funding countries, such as the United Kingdom and Euro area. Moreover, instead of 
sorting currencies to portfolios based on their forward discount, one should concentrate on 
specific currency pairs that have the desirable characteristic. It could be argued that in some cases 
the common cultural background can be more significant factor than the actual geographical 
distance between two countries.  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to study more thoroughly how the different investor types 
affect the predictability of carry trade returns and currency crashes in major investment countries. 
My results suggest that the collective actions of numerous retail investors are slower than those 
of larger hedge funds. A better understanding on what type of investors are participating in a 
certain carry trade could help speculators to benefit more from the effect of slow moving capital.  
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Appendix A.  
Table A.1: Carry portfolios’ funding and investment currencies 
This table shows breakdown of the carry portfolios’ funding and investment currencies in EMEA, Asia Pacific and Americas. In HmL strategy, I borrow 
(invest in) the currency with the smallest (largest) forward discount. HmL3 follows the same principle, but instead of one currency I go long (short) in the three 
currencies with the three largest (smallest) forward discounts. The values in the table indicate how often the currency has been chosen to the portfolio, 1 being 
100%. High refers to investment currencies and Low to funding currencies. The sample period spans from 1/1999 to 1/2014 and the portfolios are rebalanced at 
the end of each month. 
 
EMEA 
HmL 
  
HmL3 
  
Asia Pacific 
HmL 
  
HmL3 
  
Americas 
HmL 
         
High Low 
  
High Low 
  
High Low 
  
High Low 
  
High Low 
 
 
CZK - - 
 
- 0.425   AUD - - 
 
0.243 - 
  
CAD - 0.326 
DKK - - 
 
- 0.232 
  
CNY 0.006 - 
 
0.166 0.094 
  
MXN 1.000 - 
EUR - - 
 
- 0.685 
  
HKD - 0.088 
 
- 0.580 
  
USD - 
 0.674 
HUF 0.088 - 
 
0.878 - 
  
INR 0.298 - 
 
0.818 - 
        
NOK - - 
 
0.077 0.088 
  
IDR 0.260 - 
 
0.552 - 
        
PLN - - 
 
0.028 - 
  
JPY - 0.884 
 
- 1.000 
        
GBP - - 
 
- 0.138 
  
KRW - - 
 
- - 
        
RUB 0.099 - 
 
0.243 - 
  
MYR - - 
 
- - 
        
ZAR 0.011 - 
 
0.851 - 
  
TWD - - 
 
- 0.282 
        
SEK - - 
 
- 0.431 
  
NZD 0.061 - 
 
0.536 - 
        
CHF - 1.000 
 
- 1.000 
  
PHP 0.376 - 
 
0.685 - 
        
TRY 0.801 - 
 
0.923 - 
  
SGD - 0.028 
 
- 0.895 
        
  
     
  
THB - - 
 
- 0.149 
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Figure 3: Carry portfolios’ monthly currency excess returns. This figure shows the monthly currency excess 
returns for the carry portfolios in EMEA, Asia Pacific and Americas.  The log currency excess returns are compute by 
subtracting the change in spot exchange rates from the forward discount: * = ( − ) − ∆. In HmL strategy, 
I borrow (invest in) the currency with the smallest (largest) forward discount. HmL3 follows the same principle, but 
instead of one currency I go long (short) in the three currencies with the three largest (smallest) forward discounts. 
Data are monthly, from Barclays and Reuters (Datastream). The sample period is from 1/1999 to 1/2014. 
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Appendix C. 
Table C.1: Carry trade returns and key volatility measures 
This table documents the contemporaneous relationship between the main funding countries’ volatility measures and the carry portfolios’ monthly excess 
return in EMEA, Asia Pacific and Americas. VIX, VSMI and VXJ are the main volatility indexes in U.S., Switzerland and Japan, respectively. The change 
variables are denoted by delta (∆). In HmL strategy, I borrow (invest in) the currency with the smallest (largest) forward discount. HmL3 follows the same 
principle, but instead of one currency I go long (short) in the three currencies with the three largest (smallest) forward discounts. The t-statistics are 
computed using robust standard errors and ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level respectively. The reported R2 
values are adjusted R2s. Panel A reports the monthly data for full sample period, 1/1999 – 1/2014. Panel B excludes the financial crisis (8/2007 – 3/2009). 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
  
EMEA 
  
Asia Pacific 
  
Americas 
  
HmL 
  
HmL 
  
HmL 
      
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
      
      
∆VSMI 
-0.4476*** -5.14 17.73 %   -0.2704*** -3.78 6.67 %   -0.2521*** -3.57 13.41 % 
∆VXJ 
-0.1879*** -3.09 6.35 %   -0.1838*** -2.93 6.60 %   -0.1537** -2.53 10.57 % 
∆VIX 
-0.2803** -2.60 6.13 %   -0.3788*** -5.95 12.67 %   -0.3131*** -4.16 19.55 % 
                        
VSMI -0.0872 -1.50 1.54 % 
  
-0.1362*** -3.19 5.00 % 
 
-0.1042** -2.34 6.68 % 
VXJ -0.1210*** -2.78 5.00 % 
  
-0.1392*** -4.59 7.42 % 
 
-0.1047*** -2.74 9.47 % 
VIX -0.0651 -1.21 0.69 % 
  
-0.1348*** -3.22 5.25 % 
 
-0.0920** -1.98 5.46 % 
        
  HmL3 
  HmL3         
        
  Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
        
        
        
∆VSMI -0.2930*** -5.92 20.44 % 
  
-0.1804*** -3.16 13.97 % 
        
∆VXJ -0.1545*** -4.88 11.96 % 
  
-0.1311** -2.54 15.88 % 
        
∆VIX -0.2420*** -4.33 12.81 % 
  
-0.2270*** -4.40 20.90 % 
        
                        
VSMI -0.0636* -1.88 2.44 % 
 
-0.0837** -2.34 8.92 % 
        
VXJ -0.0873*** -3.38 7.19 % 
 
-0.1067*** -4.35 20.61 % 
        
VIX -0.0517 -1.56 1.56 % 
 
-0.0934*** -2.81 12.01 % 
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Panel B: Full sample excl. financial crisis (8/2007-3/2009) 
 
  
EMEA 
  
Asia Pacific 
  
Americas 
  
HmL 
  
HmL 
  
HmL 
      
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
      
      
∆VSMI -0.4843*** -4.81 18.13 % 
  
-0.1847*** -3.00 2.15 % 
  
-0.2531*** -4.62 12.06 % 
∆VXJ -0.1914** -2.28 2.65 % 
  
-0.1496** -2.09 1.42 % 
  
-0.2066*** -2.96 8.85 % 
∆VIX -0.2743*** -2.81 4.82 % 
  
-0.3054*** -3.93 6.26 % 
  
-0.3227*** -4.81 18.06 % 
                        
VSMI -0.0128 -0.21 -0.59 % 
 
-0.0845** -2.21 1.03 % 
 
-0.0532 -1.48 0.97 % 
VXJ -0.0873* -1.66 0.65 % 
 
-0.1107** -2.30 1.46 % 
 
-0.0544 -1.21 0.60 % 
VIX  0.0000  0.00 -0.63 % 
 
-0.0923** -2.12 1.24 % 
 
-0.0359 -0.75 0.06 % 
  
 
 
 
   
  HmL3 
  
HmL3 
        
        
  Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
        
        
        
∆VSMI -0.2803*** -4.58 17.01 % 
  
-0.1221*** -4.29 6.38 % 
        
∆VXJ -0.1445** -2.55 4.62 % 
  
-0.1048*** -2.66 5.15 % 
        
∆VIX -0.2174*** -3.85 8.98 % 
  
-0.1587*** -3.98 10.09 % 
        
                        
VSMI -0.0164 -0.52 -0.47 % 
 
-0.0217 -1.28 0.00 % 
        
VXJ -0.0696** -2.12 1.64 % 
 
-0.0594** -2.46 2.84 % 
        
VIX -0.0124 -0.42 -0.54 % 
 
-0.0414* -1.93 1.54 % 
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Table C.2: Carry trade returns and liquidity spreads 
This table documents the contemporaneous relationship between the main funding countries’ liquidity spreads and the carry portfolios’ monthly excess return 
in EMEA, Asia Pacific and Americas. TED, S-TED and J-TED are the differences between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month Treasury bill in U.S., Switzerland 
and Japan, respectively. The change variables are denoted by delta (∆). In HmL strategy, I borrow (invest in) the currency with the smallest (largest) forward 
discount. HmL3 follows the same principle, but instead of one currency I go long (short) in the three currencies with the three largest (smallest) forward 
discounts. The t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level 
respectively. The reported R2 values are adjusted R2s. Data are monthly and the sample period is 1/1999 – 1/2014. The results excluding the recent financial 
crisis are not statistically significant, and are therefore not shown separately in this table. 
 
  
EMEA 
  
Asia Pacific 
  
Americas 
  
HmL 
  
HmL 
  
HmL 
      
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
      
      
∆S-TED -1.3558 -1.15 -0.07 % 
  
-3.4643 -1.20 2.86 % 
  
-1.1221 -0.78 0.24 % 
∆J-TED -5.1214 -0.37 -0.38 % 
  
-9.5810 -0.85 0.13 % 
  
-17.5871** -2.34 4.57 % 
∆TED -0.4264 -0.29 -0.51 % 
  
-3.7173** -2.61 3.75 % 
  
-0.6878 -0.54 -0.23 % 
                        
S-TED -1.3998 -0.95 0.63 % 
  
-3.2306*** -3.75 6.32 % 
  
-2.6527*** -2.84 9.76 % 
J-TED -4.5129 -1.16 0.53 % 
  
-0.7777 -0.24 -0.52 % 
  
-2.3064 -0.94 0.12 % 
TED -0.9173 -0.89 0.20 % 
  
-1.8979* -1.92 2.95 % 
  
-1.6605** -2.36 5.41 % 
  
 
 
 
   
  HmL3 
  
HmL3 
        
        
  Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
  
Coef. t-stat Adj.R2 
        
        
        
∆S-TED -1.0157 -1.50 0.17 % 
  
-0.3716 -0.20 -0.38 % 
        
∆J-TED -4.3672 -0.59 -0.21 % 
  
-5.0028 -0.83 0.28 % 
        
∆TED -0.6431 -0.81 -0.24 % 
  
-1.3332 -1.44 1.94 % 
        
                        
S-TED -0.9923 -1.07 1.05 % 
  
-2.3020*** -3.32 15.22 % 
        
J-TED -1.5971 -0.69 -0.19 % 
  
-2.5789 -1.34 1.17 % 
        
TED -0.7396 -1.15 0.76 % 
  
-1.6938*** -2.94 12.05 % 
        
 
 
